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On the modern battlefield communication is critical. Individual units require a 
steady flow of accurate information between headquarters and field units to remain effec-
tive. Just as important, denying the enemy the same needs of communicating with the 
help of electronic countermeasures (ECM), is essential to success. Communications jam-
ming and surveillance are critical to achieve information superiority. 
This thesis evaluates the performance and capabilities of one of the most ad-
vanced devices that detects, analyzes and denies enemy signals: the Rockwell Collins 
/ 146AN USQ −  transportable communication jammer. The jammer’s best strategy varies 
with respect to the modulation technique that the hostile communication system uses. As 
the theoretical analysis and the simulation results indicated, the / 146AN USQ −  jammer 
achieves its best performance over a FH/MFSK system when it selects the repeat multi-
tone jamming strategy. However, when the hostile communication system is the 802.11a  
wireless local area network (WLAN) system, the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) must se-
lect the partial-band jamming strategy with 0.1.ρ =  
The results of the theoretical analysis and the simulation modeling of the specific 
jammer for all types of jamming in manual spot and repeat modes over FH/MFSK mili-
tary communication systems and new advanced commercial wireless standards such as 
the IEEE 802.11 ,a  can be used as guidelines to select the most effective jamming strat-
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The / 146AN USQ−  jammer of Rockwell Collins is employed by the United States 
Navy for shipboard applications and by the United States Marine Corps for tactical 
ground mobile applications. Evaluating the performance of the specific jammer and in-
vestigating the most effective jamming strategies based on its capabilities are critical for 
digital battlespace dominance. 
In this thesis both the theoretical analysis and the simulation models of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer were developed. Based on the specifications and the operational 
modes of the jammer, the theoretical analysis investigated the reliability and the perform-
ance of the jammer in slow FH/MFSK military communication systems and the IEEE 
802.11a  wireless LAN commercial standard. 
Firstly, the performance of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in the manual spot mode 
versus the SINCGARS, FH/MFSK military communication system is presented. The 
jamming techniques that were analyzed are barrage noise jamming, partial band noise 
jamming and multitone jamming. The theoretical analysis showed that the interference of 
the first two types of jamming cannot be considered efficient enough on the modern bat-
tlefield, since the effect of the jamming signal on the BER becomes significant when the 
signal-to-interference noise ratio is equal to 30 dB.−  On the other hand, the manual spot 
multitone jamming technique proved to be the most effective type of manual spot jam-
ming with a capability of inflicting severe damage on a SINCGARS system for 
0 dB.b IE N =  
Secondly, the fundamental limitations of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in reactive 
mode and the link budget considerations between the transmitter-jammer and the jam-
mer-receiver were analyzed. It was shown that the / 146AN USQ −  is capable of operat-
ing in the reactive mode with no practical limitations. On the other hand, the link budget 
analysis revealed that the receive sensitivity and the output transmitted power of the 
jammer are the basic factors that determine its optimum position relative to the hostile 
communication system. 
 xx
Next, the performance of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in repeat mode against the 
SINCGARS communication system is presented. In this mode of operation the jammer 
can select the following three strategies: ( )1  noise repeat jamming, ( )2  the repeat partial-
band jamming, or ( )3  follower multitone jamming. All three reactive jamming strategies 
of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer proved to be efficient enough over the SINCGARS system 
with the follower multitone jamming technique to be the most effective. Consequently, 
the probabilistic comparison of all types of jamming in manual spot and repeat mode 
showed that the most effective jamming strategy over an uncoded slow FH/MFSK system 
is the follower multitone jamming. 
Lastly, the simulation models of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer over two communica-
tion systems were developed with the use of the SystemView software by Elanix. First, 
the simulation models of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in all types of jamming over the 
SINCGARS systems were implemented. In all cases the simulation results verified the 
conclusions that were derived from the theoretical analyses in Chapters IV and VII. Then 
the performance of the new version of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer (Rubicon II) over the 
IEEE 802.11 ,a  64 QAM ( 3 4)cR− =  with soft decision decoding WLAN commercial sys-
tem was investigated. The simulation results indicated that the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon 






On the modern battlefield communication is critical. Individual units require a 
steady flow of accurate information between headquarters and field units to remain effec-
tive. Just as important, denying the enemy the same needs of communicating, with the 
help of electronic countermeasures (ECM) is essential to success. Communications jam-
ming and surveillance are critical to achieve information superiority. One of the most ad-
vanced devices that detects, locates and analyzes enemy signals is the Rockwell Collins 
/ 146AN USQ −  transportable communication jammer, which the United States Navy 
employs for shipboard applications, and which the United States Marine Corps employs 
for tactical ground mobile applications. 
 
A. PURPOSE OF ECM 
Electronic combat in the area of command, control and communications (C3), 
ECM and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) involves strategic planning, high 
technology equipment and operational experience. Although fixed frequency C3 nets are 
vulnerable to relatively unsophisticated ECM, spread spectrum ECCM severely chal-
lenges the ECM system design by reducing its ability to select its targets. 
Applying ECM against target C3 signals may have one or more of the following 
basic purposes: detecting target activity, monitoring target signals, jamming target nets, 
and imitating target messages to deceive the operators. The ECM will normally be ap-
plied selectively and covertly, if possible, to avoid a defensive response by the target. 
Since a jamming transmitter may be vulnerable to lethal countermeasures, prudent ECM 
operational procedures require detection and identification of a target signal and perhaps 
an estimate of the potential jamming effectiveness before a jamming signal is transmitted. 
In addition, the ECM system may record target traffic on a long-term basis, determine the 






B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
Fixed-frequency communication channels are vulnerable to electronic counter-
measures since an adversary has sufficient time to identify the operating frequency. To 
decrease this vulnerability, several modes of ECCM have been developed. These modes 
spread the transmitted signal over a large bandwidth in order to reduce the probability of 
detection and jamming. The two principal forms of ECCM are frequency-hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS or FH) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS or DS). 
Each of these ECCM techniques possesses advantages and disadvantages for 
various operational situations. The objective of this thesis was to evaluate the perform-
ance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in military communication nets for both fixed-
frequency and frequency-hopped channels in order to determine the system’s capabilities 
and limitations. Based on the technical characteristics of the device, the performance of 
the specific jammer was investigated for a non-coherent frequency-hopped M-ary fre-
quency-shift keying (FH/MFSK) communication system under an additive zero-mean 
Gaussian noise (AWGN) environment for various kinds of jamming. Based on the opera-
tional modes of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer, the types of jamming are separated into two 
categories, jamming methods in a manual spot jamming mode and jamming methods in a 
reactive or follower jamming mode. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II analyzes the characteristics and the 
mode of operations of / 146AN USQ − . Chapter III explores the importance of spread 
spectrum communication systems. Chapter IV presents the performance of the jammer in 
various methods of manual-spot jamming in frequency-hopped communication systems. 
Chapter V discusses the configuration of the jammer and its geometric and physical re-
strictions in reactive or follower jamming mode. Chapter VI describes the performance of 
/ 146AN USQ −  to determine which frequency range to jam when it operates in the reac-
tive jamming mode. Chapter VII analyzes the performance of the jammer for FH/MFSK 
systems using various types of jamming in reactive or follower jamming mode. In the 
first part of Chapter VIII, the simulation models that correspond to the theoretical analy-
sis of Chapters IV and VII are presented together with a comparison of the theoretical 
and simulation results. The second part presents the simulation models and the corre-
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sponding results of the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  over the IEEE 802.11a  
Wireless LAN commercial standard. Chapter IX presents a summary with conclusions 
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II. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND MODES OF OPERATION 
OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER 
This chapter analyzes the technical characteristics of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer, 
its capabilities, and its modes of operation. This chapter contains the information used for 
the theoretical analysis and the simulation models that are presented in the following 
chapters. 
 
A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
 
1. Description 
The / 146AN USQ −  jamming device combines fixed-frequency communications, 
electronic support (ES) and electronic attack (EA) functions within the frequency range 
of 1.5 MHz  to 2500 MHz.  In all ES and EA modes, the system provides communica-
tions monitoring or jamming capability against single-channel fixed frequency and fre-
quency hopping communications in the high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), 
ultra high frequency (UHF), and super high frequency (SHF) bands. When not used for 
command and control warfare (CCW), the system can be operated as a standard radio for 
conventional AM/FM/SSB communications within its frequency range. 
 
2. Architecture 
The / 146AN USQ −  CCW system is supplied with dual receiver-transmitter (RT) 
and dual base band cards. Using two RTs for CCW functions reduces scan time and per-
mits simultaneous scan and jamming activities. 
The major components of the system are the control computer, splitter/limiter, re-
ceiver, signal processor, audio interface, waveform generator, exciter, amplifier interface, 
and power amplifier. The system contains several other components that are not consid-





3. System Components 




Figure 1.   System Functional Block Diagram [From Ref. 1] 
 
 
a. Control Computer 
The system is initialized and managed through use of a laptop control 
computer. The CCW system is entirely operable by one operator using only the controls 
and displays of the control computer. The computer provides a digital audio interface that 
allows recording and playback of audio files. 
 
b. System Controller 
The system contains a processor that communicates with the laptop com-







The splitter/limiter connects multiple receiver units to a single receive an-
tenna. It also provides a limiter that protects the receiver unit from being damaged by in-
put RF power levels. 
 
d. Receiver Unit 
The receiver unit seen in Figure 2 provides the RF signal selection and 
signal demodulation functions. The receiver supports narrowband and wideband filtering 
and can provide a 70-MHz  IF output.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Radio Receiver-Transmitter RT-1747 [From Ref. 1] 
 
e. Receive Signal Processor 
The receive signal processor provides signal processing of a receiver sig-
nal to measure energy and, based on this measurement, in turn measures the frequency 
offset from the tuned frequency. The signal processor provides signal digitization and 
demodulation to store digital signal information during reception. 
 
f. Waveform Generator 
The waveform generator drives the RF exciter. The generator can select 
from the following input sources: microphone, analog line, input including internal ana-
log tone generators, digitized FSK/PSK data stream from a data port, digitized I/Q quad-
rature data stream from a data port, and an internally available coded-synthesis algorithm. 
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g. RF Exciter Unit 
The RF exciter unit accepts a wideband 70-MHz  IF signal output from a 
waveform generator and translates the signal to the tuned RF frequency to drive a high 
power amplifier. The RF exciter also accepts narrowband signals and processes the sig-
nals as indicated previously. 
 
h. Amplifier Interface 
The amplifier interface provides the necessary interfaces and control logic 
for the RF high power amplifiers (HPA). The interface accepts the exciter signal from the 
exciters and provides appropriate RF switching that allows an exciter output to be con-
nected to any of the HPA bands. 
 
i. High Power Amplifiers 
The RF high power amplifiers amplify the exciter RF output to obtain a 
high power RF output to an appropriate antenna. Each amplifier output gain is adjustable 
and provides power feedback that can measure the power level and display it to the op-
erator. 
 
B. INTEGRATED SYSTEM  
The / 146AN USQ −  jammer has three operating modes: normal communications, 
electronic support, and electronic attack. All of the modes of operation cooperate with the 
waveform generator in order to produce the necessary signals for every kind of operation. 
 
1. Communication Mode 
The system functions as a half-duplex communications transceiver or as a wide-
band transceiver in the 1.5-MHz  to 2500-MHz  frequency ranges. It supports AM and 
FM modulation/demodulation in VHF/UHF/SHF and AM SSB demodulation in HF, us-
ing a baseband analog audio. The system provides the option for an externally modulated 
70-MHz  IF signal as an input to the RF transmit frequency, the HPA selection and the 
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system key state. The carrier frequency of the transmitted signal has an accuracy of 1 part 
in 710 . 
 
2. Electronic Support (ES) Modes  
The system behaves as an ES system by searching the desired frequency range or 
channels for signal activity. It provides a preset channel mode in which the acquisition 
time is less than 750 µs  per preset channel frequency plus 1.05  times the sum of the 
sample time of the active signals plus the delay associated with the selected IF band-
width. 
The system can also perform a logging mode for all signals detected within the se-
lected frequency range and resolution. The scan rate of the log mode is 500 kHz/ms  with 
a resolution of 25 kHz.  
 
3. Electronic Attack (EA) Modes  
The system performs as an EA mode by searching the desired frequency range or 
channels for signal activity and jamming detected target frequencies. The system has two 
modes of operations in EA, ( )1  spot and ( )2  reactive communications jamming. Manual 
spot jamming is defined as jamming on a single frequency for a duration determined by 
the operator. This focuses the jammer’s entire power output on a single target. This tech-
nique seems to be inefficient against frequency hopping systems, but a skilful operator 
can use it against FH systems with the proper use of the waveform generator, as ex-
plained in Chapter IV. 
In Reactive jamming or follower jamming, the jammer detects energy above a pre-
selected signal threshold and automatically jams upon detection. It ceases jamming when 
the signal is no longer above the set threshold. This technique focuses the jammer’s 
power output on a single frequency and is highly energy efficient but does not reduce the 
potential for electronic fratricide. The tuning frequency accuracy of the transmit signal 
with respect to the tuning frequency of the received signal is equal to or better than 
500 Hz.  The reactive jamming mode of operation can detect, track, and jam frequency 
hoping systems with the jammer’s receiver and processing means. The effectiveness of 
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this mode of operation, discussed in Chapter V, is determined by the physical geometry, 
the target hopping rate, the percent of each target’s signal dwell required to be interfered 
with, and the jammer speed. 
The response time of the system, as defined by the time from signal detection to 
signal jamming, is less than 500 µs.  The response time does not include the acquisition 
time and the tuning time. 
The system provides a look-through capability to determine if the signal has 
ceased transmission. The look-through interval is adjustable from 5  to 9999 ms,  and the 
look-through time does not exceed 1 ms.  
A basic capability of / 146AN USQ −  is the insertion of time holes in the transmit 
waveform. The interval between time holes is adjustable from 0  to 9999 ms,  and the 
duration of the time hole is adjustable from 0  to 2000 ms. 
 
4. Waveform Generation 
The system provides RF modulation modes of AM, FM, CW, and external. The 
system is capable of producing MFSK modulation for 2, 4,8.M =  The symbol rate ( )sR  
is programmable between 25 Hz  and 25 kHz  with a resolution of 1 Hz.  With the same 
specification, the system can also generate an MPSK modulation for 2,4.M =  
 
C. SUBSYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS 
 
1. Receiver Subsystem 
The receiver subsystem provides the RF-to-IF conversion for signal detection and 
wideband receive modes, and provides RF to baseband conversions for all other modes of 
operation. The tuning resolution is 1 Hz  in less than 500 µs, and the noise figure is 3 dB  
for VHF and 6 dB  for HF. This specification is based on the use of a low-noise amplifier 




The receiver can detect signal energy from 97 dBm−  to 50 dBm  in a 3.2 kHz  
bandwidth for HF, and 120 dBm−  to 75 dBm−  in 16-kHz  bandwidth, with an LNA pre-
amplifier, in all other bands. The accuracy of the detecting signal is within 3 dB.±  The 
receiver can provide two analog selectable bandwidths for the reception of narrowband, 
nominal 16-kHz  BW and wideband, nominal 110-kHz  BW signals. The receiver can also 
provide digital filter bandwidths from 3.2 kHz  to 100 kHz  in octave steps. The digital 
filters have a passband ripple of 1 dB,  a bandwidth accuracy of 10 %, and a stopband at-
tenuation of 60 dB. 
The receiver subsystem provides a wideband 70-MHz  intermediate frequency in-
terface. The bandwidth of the receive wideband interface is shown in Table 1. 
 
Frequency Range Bandwidth 
1.5 MHz 30 MHz−  10 % of tuned frequency 
20 MHz 30 MHz−  2 MHz  
30 MHz 50 MHz−  4 MHz  
50 MHz 2500 MHz−  6 MHz  
Table 1.   Bandwidth of the Receive Wideband Interface 
 
2. Waveform Generator 
The waveform generator can mix the audio from a microphone, external audio 
and internal tone generators. It provides two simultaneous output signals. Each output is 
routed to an independent RF exciter. Waveform generators are capable of independently 
selecting any of the modulation sources. This includes analog and digital sources, such as 
pre-recorder WAV files and digital data streams. The modulation formats are described 
as follows:  
a. Voice Modulation 
The waveform generator provides AM and FM modulation from the base-




b. Digital Modulation 
The waveform generator produces M-ary FSK with 2,4,8M =  and 
MPSK with 2,4.M =  
 
c. On-Off Keying (OOK) Capability 
OOK modulation can be provided from the waveform generator with a 
programmable on-off duty cycle and frequency. The OOK modulation can operate in 
conjunction with any of the supported modulation, and is programmable to generate time 
holes from 100  to 2000 ms  with a resolution of 20 ms  with an accuracy of 10 ms.  
 
d. Continuous Wave (CW) Tone Frequency 
A CW tone that can be adjusted from 2 Hz  to 12.5 kHz  with 1% accu-
racy is generated by the waveform generator. 
 
e. Random Tone Frequency 
The waveform generator provides a modulation that consists of multiple 
tone frequencies that are adjustable in both frequency range and duration. A pseudo-
random number generator (PN sequence) determines the selected frequencies and their 
duration. 
 
f. Random Data Stream 
A pseudo-random data stream of bits generated from a feedback shift reg-






















Figure 3.   Linear Feedback Shift Register with 8  Stages 
 
g. Keystream 
The waveform generator can provide an FM modulation form consisting 
of a 300 Hz  square, followed by 500 Hz  tone, followed by 700 Hz  tone, followed by no 
tone. This keystream sequence has programmable intervals for each sequence step be-
tween 1 ms  and 2000 ms  in 1 ms  steps. An example of such a keystream is shown in 









h. FDMA Generator 
The waveform generator can produce a composite baseband signal con-
sisting of a programmable number from 1 to 24  contiguous channels with the same in-
formation in each channel. The channel spacing is variable from 4 kHz  to 200 kHz  with 
a resolution equal to 20 Hz. The number of contiguous channels is restricted by the avail-
able exciter IF bandwidth. 
 
3. Amplifier Subsystem 
The transmitter is capable of sustaining a continuous output when operated within 
the limits of the environmental conditions. 
The amplifiers provide a RF output power depending on the frequency range. Ta-
ble 2 specifies the minimum output power of the amplifiers for each frequency range. 
 
Frequency Range Output Power (Watts) 
1.5 MHz 30 MHz−  1000  
20 MHz 30 MHz−  200  
30 MHz 50 MHz−  300  
50 MHz 2500 MHz−  50  
Table 2.   RF Output Power from Amplifiers 
 
 
4. Signal Detection 
The system can measure the frequency of a single signal within the selected re-
ceived passband to within 1 part in 710 . The frequency accuracy for a single carrier sig-






Measurement Accuracy (± ) Measurement Time 
1 Hz  1s  
10 Hz  100 ms  
100 Hz  10 ms  
200 Hz  5 ms  
1000 Hz  1 ms  
10 kHz  100 µs  
100 kHz  10 µs  
Table 3.   Frequency Measurement Accuracy of Signal Detector 
 
The system has variable filter bandwidths that can suppress signals 60 dB  with a 
separation of 16 kHz  in the 20  to 2500-MHz  band and 3.2 kHz  in the 1.5  to 30-MHz  
HF range. 
 
5. Operator Control Unit (OCU) 
The (OCU) provides the primary interface through which the system is controlled. 
The OCU is implemented as a Windows application running on an IBM compatible lap-
top computer. Figure 5 shows the standard model that Rockwell Collins uses for the 
CCW systems. 
 
Figure 5.   Rockwell’s Standard Control Computer for CCW Systems 
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The interface to the control computer can update the target-table status 
10 times/s,  and the time interval between the selection of a system mode and the activa-
tion of the mode does not exceed 1 second. 
The laptop display-activity screen shows the operating modes, selected parame-
ters, EA activity, target tables, and all other system information. The control screen al-
lows a user to select any of the following CCW modes: 
• Reactive Mode 
• Blind Mode 
• Scan Mode 
• Log Mode. 
The reactive, blind, and scan modes are exclusive modes, and selecting any mode 
automatically deselects the other two modes. The display-activity screen also has the ca-
pability of enabling fixed–frequency communications, jamming, monitoring, or recording 
modes of operation. 
As seen in Figure 6, the main control screen consists of three informational and 
control areas. The target table, the communication screen, and the jammer techniques 
screen. 
 
Figure 6.   Control Screen for the / 146AN USQ −  
 
17 
a. Target Table 
The target table displays a minimum of 20  target frequencies, with each 
entry containing the following fields: 
• Center frequency 
• Description 
• Technique number 
• Priority number. 
A separate table displays the list of the frequencies that are not to be 
jammed. 
 
b. Communication Screen 
The communication screen allows either or both of the transceivers to be 
employed for fixed-frequency communication modes. Each transceiver constantly meas-
ures and displays the following parameters in addition to the status of the controlled pa-
rameters: 
• Signal level 
• Measured frequency 
• Forward-output power 
• Reflected-output power 
• Scan speeds 
• Frequency-dependent threshold settings 
• Bin resolution 
• Receive and scanning bandwidths. 
If the parameter measurement cannot occur for the selected mode, then the 
measurement and display occurs only when the transceiver frequency is changed. 
 
c. Jamming Techniques Screen 
The jamming techniques screen basically contains the description of the 
technique that is used with its parameters, such as the jamming modulation, the frequency 
offset from the received frequency, the detection threshold, the channel width and some 





This completes the technical description of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer and its 
modes of operation. All the above unclassified information is the basic material used in 
this thesis to develop the theoretical models in Chapters III through VII and for the simu-
lations models used to verify the theoretical results in Chapter VIII. 
The next chapter discusses the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in the 
case of a fixed-frequency communication signal. The results verify the theory that the 
fixed-frequency communication systems are vulnerable in simple jamming techniques 
and that the only apparent solution for less interfered systems are the frequency-hopping 

















III. IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE ECM IN FHSS SYSTEMS 
The main idea of frequency-hopping spread-spectrum communications is to pro-
tect against a hostile jammer by greatly increasing the transmission bandwidth far beyond 
the minimum required for the signal information. By increasing the frequency range over 
which a system effectively operates, the jammer is forced to spread its power over a 
wider frequency band and thus be less effective from a "per-frequency" signal corruption 
capability point of view. 
 
 
A. BACKGROUND IN FREQUENCY HOPPING SYSTEMS 
The FH waveform consists of short segments of the signal being transmitted on a 
set of many different frequencies spread across a large frequency band, with the fre-
quency sequence of the hops being determined by a (PN) code. The multiplication of the 
signal prior to transmission by the output of the pseudorandom sequence generates an 
intermediate frequency of the form  
 1 ( 1)i fhf f i f= + − ⋅∆ , 1, 2,..., ,i N=  (3.1) 
where N is the maximum number of possible frequency hop bins, fhf∆  is the separation 
between the carrier frequencies of adjacent bins, and i  changes pseudorandomly every 
hT  seconds. By so doing, the entire spectrum of the signal transmitted is shifted from its 
carrier frequency cf  to the new carrier frequencies 
 1 ( 1)ic c fhf f f i f= + + − ⋅∆ . (3.2) 
The result is that the new data modulated carrier that is shifted from one fre-
quency to the next is created as Figure 7 shows. In Equation (3.2), there are N different 
frequency hop bins, each of bandwidth fhf∆ . The value of i  and thus icf  is changed peri-
odically according to some predetermined (but apparently random to a third-party ob-


















Figure 7.   Transmitter of a FH/MFSK System  
 
Generally, frequency hopping is used with noncoherent modulation formats such 
as noncoherent MFSK. Such a signal is described by 
 [ ]( ) 2 cos 2 ( ( 1) )c s is t A f m f tπ θ= + − ⋅∆ + , (3.3) 
where 1,2,..., ,m M=  iθ  is the thi  symbol phase, and f∆  is the frequency separation be-
tween each of the M signaling tones. Multiplying this signal by a signal at the intermedi-
ate frequency in (3.1) we get: 
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ } [ ]{ }
( ) 2 2 cos 2 ( 1) cos(2 )
2 cos 2 ( 1) 2 cos 2 ( 1) .
c s i i
c i s i c i s i
s t A f m f t f
A f f m f t A f f m f t
π θ π
π θ π θ
′ = + − ∆ +
= + + − ∆ + + − − − ∆ −  (3.4) 
The carrier frequencies of the first term are  
 1( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ,i s fh sf f m f f i f f m f+ + − ∆ = + − ∆ + + − ∆  (3.5) 
which is smallest for 1i =  and 1m = . In this case the carrier frequency becomes 1sf f+ . 
The carrier frequencies for the second term are  
 1( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ,i s fh sf f m f f i f f m f− − − ∆ = + − ∆ − − − ∆  (3.6) 
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which is largest for i N=  and 1m = . In this case the carrier frequency becomes 
1 ( 1) fh sf N f f+ − ∆ − . 
If the smallest frequency of the first term is greater than the largest frequency of 




Nf f B f−> + + ∆ , (3.7) 
where B is the required guardband above and below the high and the low frequency sig-
naling tones, respectively. In this case, a high-passed filter is used to remove the fre-
quency difference contribution, and the frequency-hopped signal becomes  
 [ ]{ }( ) 2 cos 2 ( 1)T c i s is t A f f m f tπ θ= + + − ∆ + . (3.8) 
One obvious advantage is that a hostile jammer needs to know the pseudonoise 
sequence of the communicator’s transmitter in order to jam the specific hop bin where the 
transmitter operates at each time instant. To overcome a follower jammer, the signal must 
hop to a new carrier frequency before the jammer can complete its tracking process. In 
Chapter V, the fundamental limitations of a repeat jammer are analyzed and the specific 
parameters that influence the capabilities of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer are described. 
Another advantage of a FH system is due to the fact that the power spectral den-
sity of the frequency-hopped signal is identical to that of the conventional signal in a spe-
cific hop bin as can also be seen in Figure 7. However, since the signal hops from bin to 
bin, and assuming that the probability that any bin is occupied is equal to1 N , the aver-
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Figure 8.   Frequency-Hopped Signal 
 
B. SUMMARY 
The above advantages have characterized the FH systems as being the most resis-
tive to jamming when compared to other communication systems. As a result, most of the 
military communication systems use this technique to secure communication and to avoid 
interference. However, this thesis attempts to identify and to classify the strengths and the 
weaknesses of these ECCM techniques in order to define the physical limitations and pa-
rameters of an optimum advanced transponder ECM system. 
In the next chapters, the capabilities of a technologically advanced, 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer are investigated in the worst environment, from the jammer’s 
point of view, such as FH/MFSK systems. Specifically, Chapter IV analyzes the per-
formance of the jammer when it operates in manual spot jamming against an uncoded 










IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER IN 
VARIOUS METHODS OF MANUAL SPOT JAMMING 
The purpose of this chapter is to predict the message error probability that the 
/ 146AN USQ −  produces in an uncoded slow frequency hopped MFSK communication 
system in manual spot jamming. Before examining each jamming strategy, describing the 
basic characteristics of a FH/MFSK system, the channel model, and the symbology used 
is important. 
 
A. FH/MFSK SYSTEM, CHANNEL MODEL, AND SYMBOLOGY USED 
The FH/MFSK communication system is assumed to have N  non-overlapping 
FH bins. The bandwidth of each bin is nnB  Hz, where nnB  is the bandwidth of the non-
hopped MFSK signal. So the total frequency hopped bandwidth is augmented to be 
greater than or equal to .nnB N  In the analysis, M  expresses the modulation order where 
 2kM = , (4.1) 
and k  is the number of bits per M -ary symbol. Since the number of signal tones within a 
hop bin is M  and the total number of bins is ,N  the result is a total of M N⋅ possible 
signal tone locations. 
The symbol duration sT  is related to the hop duration hT  by: 
 h sT K T= ⋅ , (4.2) 











= . (4.4) 
The symbol rate is related to the hop rate by 
 s hR K R= ⋅ . (4.5) 
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Using the frequency-hopped signal from Equation (3.8), it is assumed that the M  
symbols possess an equal probability of occurring, so both if  and sf  are taken to be in-
teger multiples of the symbol rate sR , and the frequency difference between signal tones 
f∆  is taken to be an integer multiplier of the symbol rate. Hence, 
 .sf p R∆ = ⋅  (4.6) 
The channel that the FH/MFSK operates on is considered to be Additive White 
Gaussian Noise, and 2σ  is the power of the AWGN. The transmitter and receiver are as-
sumed to function in perfect synchronization. The receiver (seen in Figure 9 ), after de-
hopping the signal, uses a bank of M  quadrature detectors, where the integrator time 
constants are normalized to the symbol duration for notational convenience. The existing 
noise interference is expressed as AWGN with a flat average power spectral density de-
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Figure 9.   Non-coherent FH/MFSK Receiver 
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B. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER IN MANUAL SPOT 
JAMMING MODE 
This section analyzes the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in manual 
spot jamming. In this mode of operation, the jammer has no information about the trans-
mitting frequency of the hostile signal. Considering that the signal is transmitted in the 
bandwidth that the / 146AN USQ −  covers, the methods that the operator can use are bar-
rage noise jamming, partial-band noise jamming, and multitone noise jamming. 
Before analyzing all of the above methods, it is necessary to show the perform-
ance of the system without any interference other than the existence of AWGN. This is 
important because many of the following results are based on the performance of the 
slow FH/MFSK system in AWGN. 
 
1. Performance of FH/MFSK in AWGN 
When AWGN is present, the total received signal in the receiver of the FH/MFSK 
is the transmitted signal (3.8) plus the AWGN ( )n t  with PSD 0 2.N  So 
 { }( ) 2 cos 2 ( 1) ( )T c i s f is t A f f m t n tπ θ = + + − ∆ + +  . (4.7) 
The process of dehopping does not affect AWGN. Hence, considering perfect 
synchronization and timing, the performance of the FH/MFSK is the same as when no 
frequency hopping existed. Based on the analysis of Reference [2] , the probability of the 


















− = −  + ∑ , (4.8) 
where bE  is the bit energy and the fraction of 0bE N  is the signal-to-noise ratio. 
For orthogonal signaling, when a symbol error occurs, all 1M −  wrong symbols 
have an equal probability of occurring. Since the probability of symbol error is independ-
ent of the symbol transmitted, for the following analysis any symbol can be chosen to be 
analyzed. Suppose the signal corresponding to the all-zero symbol is transmitted. In this 
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case, the average number of 1’s corresponds to the average number of bit errors. Based 




T kM=  (4.9) 
When the signal corresponding to the all-zero symbol is transmitted, Equation 
(4.9) represents the total number of possible wrong bits in all of the incorrect symbols. 





=− − . 
Therefore, given that a symbol error has occurred, the average probability of bit 
error can be related using the following equation 
 average number of wrong bitsbitsnumber of
symbol
z =  
                                    ( ) ( )
1 .
2 1 2 1
kM M
M k M
= =− −  (4.10) 
As Reference [ ]2  indicates, the combination of Equations (4.8) and (4.10) results 
in the probability of bit error for the non-coherent FH/MFSK system in AWGN. So 
b sP z P= ⋅ , or 
















− = − − + ∑ . (4.11) 
Figure 10 is the plot of (4.11) for the cases of FH/BFSK, FH/4FSK, and FH/8FSK, which 
are the three FH systems that are compared for all methods of jamming. 
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Figure 10.   Performance of FH/MFSK in AWGN for 2, 4,8M =  
 
In Figure 10 , the values of the three curves for 0 13.35 dBbE N =  have been marked. 
This is the value of the signal-to-noise ratio that is considered for the future theoretical 
and simulation models. 
 
2. Performance of the AN/USQ-146 Jammer Using the Barrage Noise 
Jamming Technique over a FH/MFSK Communication System 
Let the frequency hopping system consist of N  non-overlapping bins, each nnB  
Hz wide, where nnB  is the null to null transmission bandwidth for the conventional 





= ⇒ = . (4.12) 
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In order for the jammer to perform barrage noise jamming (BNJ) in this commu-
nication system, it creates a bandlimited noise-like signal ( )In t′  with PSD ( )InS f′ . Since 
( )In t′  and the PSD of the AWGN of the channel ( )n t  are independent random processes, 
the total PSD is 
 0 ( )
2 IT n
NN S f′= + . (4.13) 
As mentioned in Chapter II, for manual spot jamming, the / 146AN USQ −  jam-
mer has no efficient way of knowing in which bandwidth the communication system op-
erates. However based on its ability to observe specific portions of bandwidths over a 
long period of time, the / 146AN USQ −  jammer can make an estimate and decide to 










S f′  is 2IN ′  across the entire frequency bandwidth. Since the bar-
rage noise that the jammer has created is flat across the bandwidth of the receiver, it af-






′= + . (4.14) 
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Based on Reference [ ]2 , by replacing the noise power oN  from Equation (4.11) 
with the total noise power TN  from Equation (4.14), the performance of the jammer in 






















   −  +     − +     + ′   
=
− = − − + ∑  (4.15) 
The jammer has no information in this mode of operation whether the system it is trying 
to jam is a FH or not, so the overall jamming power is the same as if the system were a 
conventional MFSK. The interference power with barrage noise jamming for conven-




I nn nn I
N NP B B N= + = . (4.16) 





N NP W NB N
′ ′ ′ ′= + =    (4.17) 
Since the amount of power that the jammer spends is specific, Equations (4.16) and 
(4.17) are equals, so 




′ =  (4.18) 
Replacing IN ′  in Equation (4.15) with the result in Equation (4.18) reveals that 




















   − ⋅ +     − +     +    
=
− = − − + ∑ . (4.19) 
When AWGN is not considered negligible, a common value for the signal-to-
noise ratio, 0 ,bE N  is the 13.35 dB.  The number of channels N  that the FH system has 
is a parameter that the jammer in this mode of operation cannot estimate. The signal-to-
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interference power, ,b IE N  is the basic variable that the jammer can dynamically con-
trol. The two other parameters that Equation (4.19) depends on is the modulation order 
M  and the number of channels .N  In Figure 12,  the performance of FH/MFSK for 
2, 4,8M =  has been plotted, keeping the number of the channels as a parameter in order 
to observe how N  influences the performance of the jammer. 
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Figure 12.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in Manual Spot Barrage Noise Jamming on 
the Performance of a FH/ MFSK System in AWGN for Various Number of Hop Bins 
 
Figure 12  clearly shows that as the number of channels in the FH system in-
creases, the performance of the jammer decreases. The performance of the jammer is also 
influenced by the order of the FH/MFSK modulation. As M  increases, the ability of the 
jammer to jam the signal decreases. It is characteristic of the fact that in order for the 
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jammer to cause a probability of bit error in the range of 0.5,bP =  it has to achieve a sig-
nal-to-interference noise power equal to 30 dB.−  
Comparing Figure 10  with Figure 12 , it is clear that for the whole range of posi-
tive values b IE N  the barrage noise jamming negligibly increases the probability of er-
ror in the FH/MFSK system when the number of channels is increased to 2320.  The 
number 2320  is the number of channels that is used in the rest of the thesis, since the 
most advanced airborne system, which is called SINCGARS, has 2320N =  hop bins 
with a hopping rate 100 hops s.hR =  Focusing on the case in which the / 146AN USQ−  
jammer’s purpose is to jam a SINCGARS system, the performance of the jammer is de-
scribed by Equation (4.19) with the parameter 2320.N =  
In order to understand the jammer’s influence on a FH/MFSK signal when it op-
erates using barrage noise jamming in the manual spot mode, one can examine Figure 13,  
which compares the case of a FH/MFSK system, like SINCGARS ( 2320N = ), in BNJ 
and in AWGN. In Figure 13 , the dash lines indicate the probability of error for each case 
of modulation order, in AWGN for 0 13.35 dB.bE N =  
The conclusions that arise from the Figure 13  is that the barrage noise jamming 
technique has a basic disadvantage. It lacks any information about the instantaneous fre-
quency of the transmitted signal. This forces the jammer to spread its power equally on 
the whole transmitted bandwidth. As the number of channels M  of the FH signal in-
creases, the width of the area that the jamming power must cover also increases, which 
reduces the PSD of IP . This is the reason that the jammer needs an output power 1000  
times greater that the signals power in order to achieve a probability of bit error between 
0.1  and 0.5 . 
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Figure 13.   Performance of the / 146AN USQ −  in Barrage Noise Jamming for 2320N =  in 
FH/MFSK 
 
Figure 13  reflects the performance of the jammer in BNJ and emphasizes the fact 
that the jammer does not influence the communication system for all the positive values 
of ,b IE N  since the probability of error of the signal is at the same level as if the system 
were experiencing only the noise of the channel. Only when the jamming power becomes 
large enough in relation with the signal power does the communication system begin to 
be affected by the barrage noise jamming. 
The performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in a manual spot jamming using 
the BNJ technique cannot be considered efficient enough, especially on the modern bat-
tlefield. It does not degrade the system’s performance enough, is not power efficient, and 
its success depends to a great extent on the experience of the operator. These disadvan-
tages lead to the investigation of other more advanced ways of jamming, such as the par-
tial-band jamming with the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in manual spot jamming. 
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3. Performance of the AN/USQ-146 Jammer Using the Manual Spot 
Partial-band Noise Jamming Technique over a FH/MFSK Communi-
cation System 
In partial-band noise jamming (PBJ), the jammer spreads the noise interference 
over a portion of the entire spread spectrum bandwidth. Because of the smaller band-
width, the partial-band noise jammer is considerably more effective than the barrage 
noise jammer. 
The / 146AN USQ −  jammer, as described in Chapter II, can produce, with the 
help of the waveform generator, pulses containing noise with variable bandwidth. Practi-
cally and analytically, this is identical to creating pulse noise jamming. 
In the following analysis, the jammer transmission bandwidth is denoted as jW . 
Considering that that the spread spectrum bandwidth is W , the fraction of the communi-




ρ = , (4.20) 
with 
 0 1ρ< ≤ . (4.21) 
Based on the information that the control screen of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer 
provides to the operator, it is logical to assume that an integral part of the frequency hop 








Figure 14.   Partial-band Noise Jamming 
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′′′′ = , (4.22) 
in the jW  bandwidth and zero elsewhere. The overall output power of the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer is the same whether it is using a barrage or a partial-band jamming technique. 
The interference power with partial-band noise jamming IP′′  is equal to the interference 
power in barrage noise jamming IP′ , which equals the interference power IP  for the 
conventional MFSK. 
 I I IP P P′ ′′= = . (4.23) 
The interference power with partial-band noise jamming for the FH/MFSK is 
 ( )2 1 0
2
I
I I nn I
NP W W N NB Nρ ρ ρ ρ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + − ⋅ = =   . (4.24) 




′′′ = = .  (4.25) 
From (4.25) it becomes clear that the main effect of the partial-band noise jam-
ming is the increase of the PSD by 1 1ρ ≥  in the bins that are affected. As ρ  becomes 
smaller, the PSD of the noise-like signal increases and the jammer affects the communi-
cation system even more. 
As Reference [ ]3  indicates, the practical limitation is that the jammer may not be 
able to transmit the peak power ( )IP Nρ  when ρ  is too small. One other limitation is 
that the jammer cannot jam less than one frequency hopping bin. This observation results 
in a lower limit in ρ , and (4.21) becomes 
 1 1
N
ρ< ≤ . (4.26) 
Keeping in mind the two above limitations, the analysis of how the partial-band 
jamming technique performs continues by using the result obtained in the barrage noise 
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jamming (4.15). Replacing IN ′  in Equation (4.15) with N ′′ , and using the result of (4.25) 






















   −  +     − +     +    
=
− = − − + ∑ (4.27) 
The probability that a bin is jammed Pr(bin is jammed) is equal to ρ . On the 
other hand, the probability that the bin is not jammed Pr(bin not jammed)  is equal to 
1 ρ− . When the signal is not jammed, only the AWGN that exists in the channel influ-
ences it. Therefore the general form of the probability of error of the FH/MFSK system 
under the influence of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in manual spot mode using the partial-
band jamming technique is 
Pr(bin jammed) (hop is jammed)+ Pr(bin not jammed) (hop is not jammed),b b bP P P= ⋅ ⋅




































   −  +     − +     +    
=
 −−  + +  
=
− = − − + 
− + − − − + 
∑
∑
     (4.28) 
Figure 15  illustrates the plot of (4.28) for 0 13.35 dBbE N =  with ρ  as a parameter. This 
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Figure 15.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in Manual Spot Partial-Band Noise Jam-
ming on the Performance of a FH/ MFSK ( )2320N =  System in AWGN for Various ρ  
As mentioned previously 0 13.35 dB,bE N = which means 0 1.bE N   Also it is 
correct to consider that the PSD IN ′′  of the partial-band jamming is much larger than the 
PSD 0N  of the AWGN. The first assumption allows an analyst to neglect the second 
term in (4.28). By taking into account the second assumption, the 0bE N  term can also 

















 −− ⋅ ++  
=
− = − − + ∑ . (4.29) 
Since the jammer wishes to maximize bP , it must find the appropriate ρ  that will 
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 −−  + +  
=
 −−  + +  
=
− ∂ −= − ⋅ ⋅ ∂ − + + 




In order to find the most appropriate ρ , which will cause the worst performance in the 
FH/MFSK system, (4.30) must be set equal to zero. For convenience, in the following 
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As Reference [ ]2  reveals, the numerical solutions 0y  of the above equation, for 





Table 4.   Solution of (4.31) as a Function of M 
 
The worst case fraction of jammed bandwidth ( )wcρ , which depends on the type 








ρ = . (4.32) 












By replacing in (4.16) the result of (4.33) follows 







>  (4.34) 
The null-to-null transmission bandwidth of an MFSK system is 
 ( 1) 2nn sB M f R= − ∆ + . (4.35) 
For orthogonal noncoherent MFSK, (4.35) becomes 




RB M R R
k
+= − + = . (4.36) 
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  >  
 
2 1.76 dB  
4 0.213 dB 
8 0.33 dB 
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The values in Table 5  show the output power that the jammer must produce in 
order to be effective in the worst case partial-band jamming technique. 

















− = − − + ∑ . (4.38) 
The above equation has as a variable the signal-to-interference noise ratio 
,b IE N  and two basic parameters: M  and N . Setting 2320,N =  the only parameter is 
the modulation order ,M  which also specifies the value of 0y  from Table 4 . 
For comparison reasons, Figure 16  gives the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer in the manual spot mode using the partial-band jamming technique based on 
Equation (4.38) for two values of .N  It is obvious from the figure that the increase in the 
number of hop bins ( )N  negatively influences the performance of the jammer. The jam-
mer for the case of the SINCGARS system ( )2320N =  can achieve a probability of bit 
error equal to 0.5  when 35 dB.b IE N = −  On the other hand for 50,N =  the necessary 
signal-to-interference noise ratio is close to 20 dB.−  
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Figure 16.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Worst Case Partial-Band Noise Jamming 
on the Performance of a FH/ MFSK System in AWGN for 2320N = and 50N =  
By comparing Figure 15  to Figure 16 , it becomes clear that the effect of the 
worst case partial-band noise jamming is to change the dependence of bP  on b IE N  
from an exponential one to an inverse one. The result improves the performance of the 
jammer, especially for the case of the FH/4FSK and FH/8FSK. The problem for the jam-
mer in the worst case PBJ is that as b IE N  increases, the jammer requires higher peak 
power and covers fewer and fewer frequency hop bins, since wcρ  becomes smaller. 
By knowing that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer has specific output power that de-
pends on the range of the bandwidth that it will jam, it can be concluded that even though 
partial-band noise jamming is always possible from the jammer, the worst case may not. 
 
41 
The worst case will be possible only when the output power of the jammer ( )IP  divided 
by the power of the signal ( )cP  is greater than the limits of Table 4 . 
The operation of the jammer in manual spot mode, using the partial-band jam-
ming technique, can seriously damage the communication system if it is working with the 
worst case fraction of jammed bandwidth wcρ . In the case when the power of the signal is 
so large that the jammer cannot transmit the appropriate output power that Table 4  indi-
cates, then the partial-band jamming causes a smaller degradation in the performance of 
the communication system. This degradation cannot be considered efficient enough on 
the modern battlefield. 
 
4. Performance of the AN/USQ-146 Jammer Using the Manual Spot 
Multiple-Tone Jamming Technique over a FH/MFSK Communication 
System 
The / 146AN USQ −  jammer operating in manual spot mode can transmit equal 
power jamming tones, randomly distributed across the entire frequency-hopped band-
width. The particular jammer also has the capability to observe the transmitted frequen-
cies and their history in order to understand the structure of the signal. If the jammer can-
not verify the structure of the system, then this mode of operation is worthless in a FH 
system. This type of multiple-tone jamming is called independent multitone interference. 
Based on Reference [ ]3  for the FH/MFSK, in this mode of operation, there are 
two possible cases concerning the signal and jammer tones within a specific frequency-
hop bin. In the first case, there is no interference at all in the bin (the jammer tones are 
elsewhere), and the probability of error is the same as for the conventional MFSK in the 
AWGN. In the second case, there is jammer interference in the bin. 
This section considers the general case of a jammer using q  jamming tones 
within the N  frequency hop bins, even though Chapter II revealed that the / 146AN USQ−  
jammer can transmit two tones simultaneously. The replacement of 2q =  will be done at 
the end of the analysis. 
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It is obvious that the number of interfering tones ( )q  is less than or equal the pos-
sible signaling frequencies ( )M , 
 1 q M≤ ≤ . (4.39) 





= , (4.40) 
and they are spaced in frequency, at least, by nnB  Hertz. The jammer’s total power is TIP . 
This is the most suited assumption, since the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in this mode of op-
eration cannot specify the bandwidth of the FH system and cannot send the jamming 
tones in the same frequency hop bin. 
When I cP P<  the jammer cannot cause any damage to the communication system 
and the probability of error ensues from the AWGN only. When I cP P> , a symbol error 
is made if the jamming tone is within the FH band but not in the same energy detector 
filter bandwidth as the desired signaling tone. When I cP P=  a symbol error occurs with a 
probability 0.5  under the conditions described for .I cP P>  
Based on Reference [ ]2 , the jammer can therefore jam the most FH bands if 





 ≈   
, (4.41) 
where •    denotes the largest integer less than or equal to I cP P . Of course there must be 
at least one jammer tone so that min 1q =  and maxq  is limited by the total number of FH 
bands or maxq N= . When 1I cq P P≈ ≤   , no errors will be made since there is insuffi-
cient jammer power to jam even a single FH band. Equation (4.41) is approximate only 
because ε  has been set to zero. This value of q  is optimum since a larger q  results in 
Tc I
P P>  and no errors, and since a smaller q  results in fewer bands being jammed but no 
larger error probability for any one band. 
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The probability that any of the N FH bins is jammed is 
 Pr(bin jammed) q
N
= . (4.42) 
The probability that the hop is not jammed is 
 Pr(bin not jammed) 1 q
N
= − . (4.43) 
When a FH band is jammed and q  is chosen using (4.41), the symbol error prob-
ability is the probability that the jammer and the signal are not in the same band. This 
probability is 1M
M
−  and the total symbol error probability sP  is 
 ( )
1
1 1 0           1
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  − <      −  = + − = ≤ ≤         <   
 (4.44) 




= −  for 
orthogonal signals. Inserting (4.41) into (4.44) gives the following expression for the bit 
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  <        = + − = ≤ ≤         <   
 (4.45) 
where ( 0)bP q =  represents the probability of bit error for the FH/MFSK system, and is 
given by (4.11). Based on (4.41) the above equation can be expressed as a function of q  
or a function of I cP P . In both cases, the results are exactly the same. For compatibility 
with the previous cases q  is replaced and (4.45) becomes  
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  <     −    = + − − ≤ ≤     − +       <   
∑  (4.46) 
By examining the above equation, it is apparent that the probability of bit error in 
multitone jamming depends on the fraction I cP P , the number of hop bins N , and the 
modulation order .M  It is also obvious that since the first part of the summation is much 
larger than the second part, the modulation order M  will influence the above equation 
slightly. The graphical presentation of Equation (4.46) is shown in Figure 17  for various 
values of .N  
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Figure 17.   Performance of the / 146AN USQ −  in Manual Spot Multitone Jamming Versus 
the Ratio of the Jamming Power ( )IP  to the Signal Power ( )cP  for Various N  
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Figure 17  illustrates that similar to the case of the worst case partial-band jam-
ming, the FH system can increase the number of hop bins in order to decrease the per-
formance of the jammer. It is also obvious that as the power of the jammer becomes lar-
ger, the available number of jamming tones increases and the performance of the inter-
ferer becomes greater. 
As noted in the beginning of this section, the / 146AN USQ −  jammer has the ca-
pability of transmitting two jamming tones with power 2IP . In Figure 17, for 2,q =  the 
probability of error of a FH system with 2320N =  is 44.3 10 .−×  The maximum probabil-
ity of bit error in this case is 0.5  and can be achieved when the number of jammer tones 
is equal to the number of FH bins. 
As can be concluded from Figure 17, it would be useless for the jammer to con-
sume power in order to transmit more than two tones since its performance does not im-
prove dramatically. Moreover, since the output power of the jammer is constant, if the 
jammer were able to transmit more tones, for example ,K  with the same power as before, 
it would have to increase its power by 2K . For example, Figure 17  indicates that if the 
jammer wants to cause the same probability of error in the SINCGARS system as it 
causes in a system with 100N = , it has to produce 47  tones instead of 2.  This increases 
the output power of the jammer by 23.5.  For a comparison, Equation (4.46) can be rear-
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The plot of (4.48) in Figure 18  illustrates the probability of bit error that the 
/ 146AN USQ −  causes in a FH/MFSK system as the b IE N  increases for two values of 
.N  
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Figure 18.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Manual Spot Tone Noise Jamming on 
the Performance of a FH/ MFSK System in AWGN for 2320N =  and 50N =  
 
Figure 18  verifies that the modulation order ( )M and the number of hop bins 
( )N  only slightly influence the performance of the jammer in multitone jamming, since 
for all cases the lines are quite close to each other. In addition to that, for a relatively 
large number of hop bins, as M  increases, the performance of the system become worse. 
This phenomenon can be observed in the above figure, where the SINCGARS system 
with 8M =  behaves worse than the case of 4M = . 
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The two output tones of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer produce a signal-to-
interference jamming ratio that depends on the modulation order .M  A rearrangement of 


















 +=   
 (4.49) 
By setting 2320N =  and 2q = , Table 6  gives the values of b IE N  for all the 
cases of .M  





2  32.4  
4  31.66  
8  32.4  
Table 6.   b IE N  of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in the Multitone Jamming Technique 
 
As Figure 18  indicates, the / 146AN USQ −  jammer achieved a probability of bit 
error near to 44.3 10−×  for the values of Table 6 . For the same values of b IE N  in PBJ, 
as can be observed in Figure 19,  the probability of bit error is between 710−  and 810 .−  
That is, the multitone jamming technique improves in the jammer performance to nearly 
40 dB. 
Generally the operation of the / 146AN USQ −  in manual spot mode, using the 
multitone jamming technique is considered to be a successful strategy. The jammer with 
no capability of detecting the transmitting frequency of the FH signal manages to cause a 
probability of bit error of nearly 310−  in a very advanced combat radio system, with the 
transmission of two jamming tones at each instance. As the jammer increases the power 
of the output tones it can causes even greater degradation. Specifically, when the total 
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output jamming power becomes equal to the signal power, the probability of bit error is 
close to 0.5 . 
The above result is highly important since it states that in all the cases examined 
in this chapter, that is, barrage noise jamming, partial-band noise jamming, and multitone 
jamming, the most advanced is the multitone jamming. This result is also verified in Fig-
ure 19  in which results from all the jamming types are plotted together. 
 













FH / BFSK 
FH / 4FSK
FH / 8FSK 
Eb/N0=13.35 dB 
Manual Spot Multitone Jamming 
Manual Spot Partial-Band Jamming 
Barrage Noise Jamming 
 
Figure 19.   Comparison of Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Manual Spot Bar-
rage, Partial-Band and Multitone Jamming on the Performance of a SINCGARS 







In this chapter the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in barrage, worst 
case partial-band and multitone jamming in manual spot mode was examined. The analy-
sis of the results indicates that the performance of the jammer is influenced by the modu-
lation order of the hostile FH/MFSK system and the number of hop bins. As Figure 19  
shows, for the same number of hop bins ( )2320N =  and signal-to-noise ratio 
0 13.35 dBbE N = , the most advanced technique that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer can 
use is the multitone jamming. In this way, independent of ,M  the jammer can greatly 
degrade the performance of the system, and can be compared to some more advanced 
jamming techniques, such as those that the / 146AN USQ −  uses in a reactive mode. 
Characteristically, the multitone jamming technique can cause a probability of bit error in 
the range of 0.5  to 0.1  with 0 dB.b IE N =  On the other hand the partial-band and the 
barrage noise jamming methods need a jamming power 1000  times greater than the sig-
nal power ( )30 dBb IE N = −  in order to succeed a 0.5.bP =  
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the disadvantage of the multitone 
jamming method is that the jammer must know the signal’s full structure before starting 
to interfere in the system. Only then is it capable of selecting jamming frequencies so that 
no more than one tone appears in each FH bin. When the jammer has no complete 
knowledge of the communication scheme, this mode does not offer any remarkable deg-
radation in the system’s performance.  
The reactive mode of operation is the next and most important capability of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer. In the next chapter, before investigating the various jamming 
techniques in the reactive mode, some basic geometric and physical restrictions that the 
reactive or follower jamming mode possesses will be presented. The next chapter is cru-
cial because it analyzes when and where the / 146AN USQ −  jammer can perform in a 
reactive mode and which parameters influence its ability to first detect and then to jam 






























V. FUNDAMENTAL LIMITATIONS OF THE AN/USQ-146 
JAMMER ON REPEATING JAMMING OPERATION MODE 
In this chapter, the fundamental limitations on the effectiveness of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer in the follower jamming mode are derived. These limitations 
arise because of the geometry and the need for a frequency estimation. 
As analyzed in Chapter II, frequency-hopping spread-spectrum is particularly use-
ful for combat primarily because it is relatively easy to operate over very large spread 
bands and allows communicators to hop out of frequency channels with interference. The 
benefits of FH are potentially neutralized by a repeater jammer, also known as a follower 
jammer, which is the most important characteristic of the / 146AN USQ − . This mode of 
operation is the reason this particular jammer is considered to be one of the most efficient 
jamming devices. 
In the reactive mode, the jammer intercepts the transmit signal, tries to determine 
the frequency of the hop, and then generates jamming in a narrow range around this fre-
quency. To be effective against a FH system, the jamming energy must reach the victim’s 
receiver before it hops to a new set of frequency channels. Thus, the greater the hopping 
rate hR  of the FH system, the more difficult it is for the repeat jammer to perform effec-
tively. 
 
A. AN/USQ-146 JAMMER CONFIGURATION AND GEOMETRICAL 
RESTRICTIONS IN REPEAT MODE OF OPERATION 
The geometry of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in repeat mode is illustrated in Fig-
ure 20 . The transmitter to receiver distance is 1D , the transmitter to jammer distance is 
2D , and the jammer to receiver distance is 3D . As Reference [ ]4  points out, for the re-
peater jamming to be effective, the arrival-time delay of the jamming relative to the de-
sired signal at the receiver must not exceed a certain fraction of the dwell time of the sig-
nal. That means, 
 2 3 1pr d
D D DT T
c c
η+ + ≤ + , (5.1) 
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where c  is the speed of the electromagnetic wave, prT  is the processing time required by 
the jammer, η  is a fraction, and dT  is the dwell time of the transmitted pulse. A rear-
rangement of (5.1) yields 
 ( )2 3 1d prD D T T c Dη+ ≤ − + . (5.2) 
If the right-hand side of the inequality is regarded as a constant, then equating the 
two sides defines an ellipse with the transmitter and the receiver at the two foci. If the 










Figure 20.   Geometrical Configuration of Communicators and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer 
 
Considering that the transmitter, receiver, and jammer are in the same plane, the 
equation that gives the jammer location is 








d pr d pr
Dx
y
D c T T D c T T Dη η
 −   + =




where the x and y axis are centered on the transmit antenna, as illustrated in Figure 20.  
Based on Reference [ ]4 , the quantity ( )d prT Tη −  can be considered equal to the hop du-
ration hT , so Equation (5.3) can be rewritten as  











D c T D c T D
 −   + =+ ⋅ + ⋅ − . (5.4) 
Since the hop rate ( )hR  is equal to the inverse of the hop duration ( )hT , it is ob-
vious that as the hop rate increases, the boundary distance that the / 146AN USQ −  jam-
mer can perform grows smaller. That is, the vehicle that the jammer is on must move 
closer to the area of interest. For example, by setting the distance between the transmitter 
and receiver 1 40 km,D =  the boundary ellipse in which the / 146AN USQ −  jammer can 
operate in repeat mode varies. This is based on the value of the hR  of the system, as Fig-










Figure 21.   Boundary Ellipses for Operation of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Repeat Mode 
for Various hR  
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Figure 21 clearly shows that the hop rate of the communication system is an im-
portant factor for the performance of the follower jammer. In the above example, if one 
considers that the jammer is on the y axis, then the distance 2D  between the jammer and 
transmitter in the case of 2000 hops/shR =  is 2 70 km.D =  On the other hand, in the case 
for which 100 hops/s,hR =  2 1500 km.D =  
Consequently, the first fundamental limitation of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer is 
that its distance from the area of interest depends on the hop rate of the communication 
system. For the SINCGARS system, since its hop rate is 100 hops/s,hR =  the boundary 
limit of the / 146AN USQ −  is an ellipse with a semi-major axis  
 6 11.5 10
2
Da = × + , (5.5) 
and semi-minor axis  
 6 1211.5 10 2.25 10b D= × + × . (5.6) 
As can be concluded from the value of 2D  for the SINCGARS case, the jammer has no 
practical boundary since the distance of 1500 km  is far from any possible position of the 
jammer in a battlefield. 
 
B. LIMITATIONS IN PROCESSING TIME OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER 
IN REPEAT MODE OF OPERATION 
Because of the repeater’s processing time prT  and the geometry, the jamming sig-
nal is not present in the victim’s receiver during a certain portion of each frequency-
hopping pulse. Based on Figure 21 and Reference [ ]5 , the duration of this portion is 
 2 3 1min ,  nj pr d
D D DT T T
c
+ − = +   . (5.7) 
Consider the repeater jamming of the FH/MFSK system for which a suitable per-
formance measure is the average probability of an error in a channel symbol sP . Let jP  
denote the probability that a symbol is jammed given that the processing time and geome-
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try are favorable for jamming the symbol. Among the reasons that jP  may be less than 
unity are 
• The receiver of / 146AN USQ −  jammer fails to monitor some of the fre-
quency channels used by the communicators. 
• The / 146AN USQ −  jammer lacks the power to jam all the intercepted FH 
communications and so ignores some of the intercepted pulses. 
• The interception receiver fails to detect some of the pulses. 
If there are many symbols per pulse, then the fraction of the symbols that are 
geometrically susceptible to jamming is well approximated by ( )d nj dT T T− . Among the 
susceptible symbols, the symbol error probability is 
 ( )1s j j j njP P F P F= + − , (5.8) 
where jF  is the conditional symbol error probability that a symbol is jammed, and njF  is 
the conditional symbol error probability that a symbol is not jammed. Among the sym-
bols that are not geometrically susceptible to jamming, which constitute the fraction 
nj dT T  of total symbols, the symbol error probability is njF . Thus, after regrouping the 
terms, the average symbol probability is given by  
 d nj njs j j nj
d d
T T T
P P F F
T T
−= + . (5.9) 
If the measured signal-to-jamming noise ratio in the passband of the victim’s re-
ceiver were deterministic, then jF  would be a function of b IE N . That is, ( )j j b IF F E N≡ . 
However, the / 146AN USQ − ’s receiver must estimate the carrier frequency of each 
pulse and then transmit a jamming waveform with the same carrier frequency. If the es-
timate is inaccurate, less jamming power will be transmitted in the receiver passband. As 











E E EF F f d
N N N
         =           ∫ , (5.10) 
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where ( )b If E N  is the probability density of b IE N , and ( )maxb IE N  is the maximum 
value of b IE N , which is realized when the frequency estimator is perfect and any other 
sources of random variation are negligible. 
To disable the FH/MFSK system, 
os s
P P≥  is necessary. Assuming that 
oj s nj
F P F≥ >  since s jP F>  cannot be achieved by any repeat jammer, and s njP F=  in the 
absence of / 146AN USQ − . Therefore, 
os s
P P≥  requires that nj dT T< . Equations (5.7) 
and (5.9) then imply that the processing time must satisfy 







T P F D D DT T
P F F c
− + −< ≤ − −− . (5.11) 
This inequality provides a fundamental upper bound on the processing time for the repeat 
mode of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer, which is to respond rapidly enough to disable a 
victim’s receiver. 
Chapter II revealed that the processing time of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer is 
500 µs.  Since it is preferable for a jammer to use the largest amount of processing time 
available, the upper bound of Equation (5.11) is equal to 500 µs.  Therefore 





P F D D DT
P F F c
− − + −− = ⋅ +  − 
. (5.12) 
Based on Reference [ ]5 , the parenthesis on the left-hand side of the above equation is the 







η −= − −  (5.13) 
so that 
 4 2 3 15 10d
D D DT
c
η − + −⋅ = ⋅ + . (5.14) 
Considering that the thermal noise in the victim’s receiver is negligible ( )0njF = , 





η = − . (5.15) 
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Following the example in Section A, the numerical value of the right-hand side of (5.14) 
is  
4 42 3 1
5




− −+ − + −⋅ + = ⋅ + =⋅  
Thus, replacing the numerical result in (5.14) produces 
 310.37 10 .dT η −⋅ = ⋅  (5.16) 
The result of (5.16) means that when the / 146AN USQ −  jammer’s purpose is to 
jam a SINCGARS system, with the specifications of the previous example and operates 
on the boundary ellipse, it can send the jamming signal in the right hop bin of the FH sys-
tem, only when a specific fraction of the dwell time of the signal is equal to 310.37 10−× . 
Based on (5.15), this specific fraction η  depends on the lower probability of symbol error 
that the jammer must achieve in the system ( )osP  and the conditional symbol error 
probability given that the symbol is jammed ( )jF . 














−⋅− > . (5.18) 
Solving (5.18) to obtain the dwell time of the signal, the inequality gives 
 10.37 msdT > . (5.19) 
The above result is very important for the effective operation of the / 146AN USQ−  
jammer in repeat mode because this result gives a second limitation of the jammer in the 
follower-on jamming. The jammer not only must work within the boundary ellipse, but 
the dwell time of the signal pulse must also be greater than a specific time. For the above 
example, this time is 10.37 ms.  
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In conclusion, obviously if the dwell time of the FH signal that the jammer is in-
terested in does not satisfy the general inequality (5.11), then the / 146AN USQ −  jammer 
cannot jam the signal at the proper time. Combining this fact with the result in Section A 
one can safely say that the effectiveness of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in the repeat 
mode depends on the hop rate and the dwell time of the targeted communication system. 
Both hR  and dT  are variable factors that the jammer cannot control. However, most of 
the standard FH communication systems have a specific value for the dwell time and re-
strictions in the maximum value of the hop rate. In the next section, the limitations on the 
hopping rate are analyzed in order to illustrate which factors influence the maximum 
value of hR  that a FH system can operate. 
 
C. LIMITATIONS ON THE HOPPING RATE OF THE FH 
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
One of the most common responses that a FH system makes to the threat of re-
peater jamming is to increase the hopping rate. However the following major problems 
arise as the hopping rate increases: 
• The cost of the frequency synthesizer increases and its reliability de-
creases. 
• Synchronization becomes more difficult. 
• Limitations on the switching time become an obstacle. 
The last problem, which usually poses the most fundamental limitation on the hopping 
rate, is analyzed in this section. 
The various time durations associated with each pulse in a frequency hopping sig-













Figure 22.   Time Duration Associated with a Pulse [After Ref. 5] 
 
The hop duration is the duration of the time interval between changes in fre-
quency, which is called the hop interval. The dead time is the duration of the part of the 
hop interval during which the frequency synthesizer produces no output. The switching 
time is the dead time plus the rise time and the fall time of the pulse. The non-zero 
switching time decreases the duration of the transmitted symbols, which in turn affects 
the transmitted spectrum. 
The dwell time of a pulse is the duration of the dwell interval at which the pulse 
has its full amplitude and the channel symbols are transmitted. A buffer circuit is required 
to store code or data symbols during the switching time. The contents of the buffer are 
extracted and transmitted during the dwell time. 
The switching time swT , plus the dwell time dwT , is equal to the hop duration hT . 
That is, 
 h dw swT T T= + . (5.20) 
The rise time ( )rT , plus the fall time ( )fT , plus the dead time ( )deT , is equal to swT . 
 sw r f deT T T T= + + . (5.21) 
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Let γ  denote the required transmission rate of channel symbols. The number of 
symbols that must be transmitted during a hop interval is hTγ ⋅ , and if this number is con-
stant from hop to hop, then  
 dw h sT T Tγ= , (5.22) 
where sT  denotes the duration of a channel symbol transmitted during the dwell time. 
Combining (5.20) through (5.22) results in 
 (1 )h s r f deT T T T Tγ− = + + . (5.23) 
This equation indicates that 1 sTγ ≤ , or sRγ ≤ , which is obvious from the definitions. 
The switching time usually cannot be arbitrarily decreased for the following rea-
sons: 
• To limit the transmission of spurious frequencies when an indirect fre-
quency synthesizer is used, it may be necessary to inhibit the transmitter 
output during frequency transitions. 
• If a pulse rises too abruptly, ringing in the output of the receiver’s inter-
mediate-frequency (IF), filter may seriously degrade the first symbol of 
the dwell interval. 
• Time may be needed for the IF filter to recover from one pulse before the 
next one is received. 
• Spectral splatter, which is the spectral overlap in extraneous frequency 
channels produced by a time-limited transmitted pulse, increases as the 
rise and the fall time decreases. 
The first symbol of the dwell interval may be seriously degraded by the phase dis-
continuities in the dehopped signal. A phase discontinuity may be caused by a Doppler 
shift, by frequency selective fading, by a non-zero dead time, or by imperfect synchroni-
zation in the receiver. 
For combat net radios, the most serious limitation on the switching time is often 
due to the spectral splatter. The spectral splatter from one frequency-hopping signal can 
cause errors in the reception of another frequency-hopping signal even though the two 
signals have widely separated instantaneous carrier frequencies [5]. To reduce the amount 
of splatter into the nearby nets and to limit the other deleterious effects of a small switch-
ing time, it is necessary that neither rT  nor fT  be much less than sT , which is itself 
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largely determined by the bandwidth of a single frequency channel and the need to limit 
the splatter. Thus, the following inequality is required 
 ( )min ,r f sT T aT> , (5.24) 
where a  is a constant that typically satisfies 1 4a≤ ≤ . The exact value of a  is a function 
of the shape of the pulse edges. 






















γ−< + . (5.25) 
The above inequality must be satisfied if the spectral splatter and possibly the other prob-
lems arising from a short switching time are to be accommodated.  
As an example of the application of (5.25), consider the SINCGARS system with 
16 kbits/s,γ =  which is the standard rate for combat net radios. Let 0deT = , 20 kbits/s,sR =  
and 1a = . Inequality (5.25) then yields 2000 hops/s.hR <  The fraction of the time that 




γγ= = = . If 2a = , then 1000 hops/s.hR <  
From these results, it appears that combat net radios cannot have hopping rates 
greater than 1 or 2 khops/s  unless either serious spectral splatter is tolerated, or γ  is 
lowered, or sR  is raised. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
To summarize the results of this chapter, it is obvious that the limitations of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer in repeat mode are based on the geometry and the need for a 
frequency estimation of the instantaneous frequency of the FH signal. These two funda-
mental limitations are controlled by two basic characteristics of the FH system: ( )1  the 
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hopping rate of the signal, and ( )2 the dwell time of the pulse. The limitations in the 
range of hR  for each FH communication system and the characteristically small process-
ing time of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer are the elements that this specific device exploits 
in order to successfully operate as a follower jammer. 
The primary purpose of any communication system is to neutralize the potential 
benefit of the repeat jammer. This benefit is the determination of the instantaneous fre-
quency that the signal is transmitting. Most communication systems cope with this threat 
by increasing the hopping rate. The next chapter analyzes mathematically how the deter-
minator of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer works and estimates the probability of correctly 
determining the transmitting frequency. The result of the above estimation shows how the 











VI. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER’S 
DETERMINATOR IN REPEAT MODE-LINK BUDGET 
CONSIDERATIONS 
This chapter studies the methods and the performance of the / 146AN USQ−  jam-
mer in determining which frequency range to jam. The jammer circuit for the frequency 
determination is not really a detector. Neither is it an estimator. It is most similar to a 
demodulator for M-ary NCFSK, but with some differences. This circuit is called a “de-
terminator” and the next two sections describe and investigate its performance. In the 
third section of this chapter, the link budget considerations that arise from the conclusions 
of section two and the power limitations of the jammer are presented. 
 
A. DESCRIPTION OF A DETERMINATOR 
In repeat mode, the determinator of the / 146AN USQ−  divides the received spread 





= . (6.1) 
The jammer would like to determine which segment contains the frequency hop. In most 
repeat jammers, the classical energy detector is used for each segment which consists of a 
band-pass filter of width ,W  a square-law device and an integrator that integrated over a 
time T . Generally 2hT T= , which meant that half a hop period was used just to deter-
mine the frequency. As a result, the geometrical restriction is extended so that the equiva-
lent hop period that the communication system needs for anti-jam protection must entail 
replacing hT  to 2hT . 
The general problem for all jammers is how to determine the hop bin in a time 
that is considered small when compared to hT . In contrast, the authorized receiver has the 
luxury of match filtering, which involves integration over the whole hop period. As dis-
cussed in [6] and based on the analysis in [4], for detectors, when 1TW ≈ , which is the 
condition pertaining here, then the “integration” just takes a single sample. The analysis 
 
64 
cannot use the Gaussian approximations typically used in energy detectors, which usually 
have 1TW  . Since only a single sample is taken, the jammer will take it as soon as pos-
sible after the hop starts. For a realizable filter of width ,W  the output due to a pulse will 
rise to its maximum at a time of about 1 fW  after the leading edge of the input pulse. The 
determinator of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer chooses to sample at about this period: 
 1wT W
= . (6.2) 
The determinator circuit has a form such as that shown in Figure 23. It is as-
sumed that the band-pass filters of width fW  are ideal brick-wall filters. The unclassified 
description of the / 146AN USQ −  does not specify if the circuit of the determinator uses 
a square law or a true envelope detector. As pointed out in [6], both detectors have the 
same performance analysis. Therefore, since directly applicable analysis can be taken 
from the literature an assumption is made and a true envelope detector is selected. 
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Figure 23.   Block Diagram of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer’s Frequency Bin Determinator 
Circuit 
 
Based on the above figure, the next section analyzes the steps that the received 
signal follows in the / 146AN USQ −  jammer. The primary purpose of this analysis is es-
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timating the probability of correctly determining which of the bN  branches contains the 
hop. 
 
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF DETERMINATOR 
The problem is similar to analyzing the demodulation of M -ary non-coherent 
FSK. The derivation in [7] will be followed. First the results of [7] are presented. Then 
these results are recast to fit the circuit of Figure 23. 
Based on Equation (4.7), the received signal at the / 146AN USQ −  jammer is 
 { }( ) 2 cos 2 ( 1) ( )T h i s f is t A f f m t n tπ θ = + + − ∆ + +  , (6.3) 
where 1,2,..., bi N= , and 0 ht T≤ ≤ . The energy hfE per symbol received at the jammer is 
 2hf h hE A T= . (6.4) 
The combination of (6.3) and (6.4), results in 
 { }( ) 2 cos 2 ( 1) ( )hfT i s f i
h
E
s t f f m t n t
T
π θ = + + − ∆ + +  . (6.5) 
The demodulator discussed in [7] uses a bank of bN  matched filters and envelope 
detectors. The thi  branch is implemented by first performing I and Q down conversion by 
multiplying the signal by ( )2 cos 2h iT f tπ  and ( )2 sin 2h iT f tπ , respectively. The re-
sult is integrated over the interval hT , and each of the I and Q integrator outputs are sam-
pled at hT , and the envelope is calculated. The largest is declared to be the bin in which 
the signal was sent. The probability of making a correct decision regarding which of the 
















EP e r e I r dr
N
+−∞ − −   = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅        ∫ . (6.6) 
The steps in the above derivation for M -ary NCMFSK are now recast to fit the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer’s determinator. First the values of the signal squared at the bin 
containing the signal and the noise variance at all bins, as seen at the sampler at the sam-
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pling instant ( hT  for the demodulator and wT  for the determinator), were found for both 
systems and are listed in Table 6. Then the corresponding output SNR for the determina-
tor in Figure 23 is found to be ( )02 ,s hE WT N  which is somewhat less than the SNR ob-
tained in the corresponding demodulator. 
 




























Table 7.   Signal-Noise-Ratio Components for the Demodulator and Determinator 
 
The probability of correctly determining of which of the bN  branches contains 



















P e r e I r dr
WT N
+−∞ − −   = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅         ∫ . (6.7) 
This probability depends upon the input SNR, ,W  hT , and .bN  However, W  and bN  are 








= , (6.8) 













gP e r e I r dr
− +∞ − −   = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅        ∫ . (6.9) 
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The values of hcP  were computed numerically as a function of g  for the above 
three values of bN . Figure 24  shows that the curves follow the “S” shape of the classical 
energy detectors with low values of 1hc bP N≈  for small g  value, close to 1 for large ,g  
and a fairly rapid transition region between these two extremes. The relative effects of 
increasing g  and bN  are seen. The improvement in detectability by increasing g  is off-
set slightly by the upward shift of the curves in Figure 24  as bN  increases. As an exam-
ple, for an increase of bN  from 100  to 1000  (10 dB  increase), the curves at 0.5hcP =  
shift to the right by almost 2 dB. Since an increase of bN  by 10 dB  also corresponds to 
an increase of g  by 10 dB,  the overall advantage to the determinator is almost 8 dB.  
 























For effective follower jamming, a high value of hcP  is needed. Since the transition 
region from very poor to very good determinability is relatively small, the middle of the 
transition is taken as a point of acceptable determination performance. At this point, the 
determinator has obtained a hcP  of 0.5 . In order to find the middle of the transition, a 
numerical analysis was performed on (6.9) to find the pairs of values of bN  and g  that 
result in 0.5.hcP =  The results are plotted in Figure 25  with linear g  against .bN  The 
range of values of bN  were from 10  to 
410  with the idea that 10  presents the lowest 
amount of jamming gain that would be worthwhile while 410  represent an upper practical 
range. Figure 25  also shows that the calculated values approximately follow a straight 
line for which an empirical relation was determined to be 
 9.61 log( ) 0.99bg N= ⋅ − . (6.10) 
 















Figure 25.   Numerically Computed Value of g and Straight Line Approximation for 0.5hcP =  
as a Function of bN  
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By equating (6.8) to (6.10), the SNR for 0.5hcP =  is found as  
 [ ]
0 0.5








= ⋅ − . (6.11) 
In a slow frequency-hopping system hfE  must be replaced by sfE K⋅  where sfE is the 
energy per symbol received by the jammer and K  is the number of data symbols per hop. 





= . (6.12) 





= . (6.13) 
Equation (6.11), based on (6.12) and (6.13), is rewritten as 
 [ ]
0 0.5







= ⋅ − , (6.14) 
or 
 ( ) [ ]2
0 0.5
log








= ⋅ − . (6.15) 
Referring to the SINCGARS system, the 58 MHzssW =  and 100 hops/s.hR =  The value 
of 0 0.5hcsf P
E N =  was calculated and then plotted in Figure 26  as a function of bN  for a 














































 as a Function of bN  for the SINCGARS Communication System  
 
As expected intuitively, the jammer’s required SNR increases as M  is increased. 
However the required SNR decreases as bN  is increased, so the jammer will try to in-
crease bN  as much as it can in order to achieve 0.5hcP =  with less SNR. The jammer’s 
choice of bN  involves a number of tradeoffs between jamming efficiency, determinator 
performance, and complexity. 
Once the determinator has decided in which segment of width W  the hop is lo-
cated, all the available jamming power is concentrated into a jamming band, jW , centered 
on this determined band. However, the determinator only knows that K M⋅ -ary tones 
exist somewhere in the width .W  The determinator does not know which M  frequencies 
the user is using. The jammer wants to jam the entire channel width W  with optimum 
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jamming efficiency ( )2W K . Therefore the maximum number of bins that the jammer 
needs to determine for the most efficient jamming is 





= = . (6.16) 




R RK k k k
R R
= = = =  so (6.16) 
becomes 
 |max 185600bN k= . (6.17) 
The / 146AN USQ −  jammer with the help of the variable filter bandwidths can 
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 for SINCGARS Case for Each FH/MFSK System 
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The figure shows that when the jammer changes the number of segments for the different 
















The next section analyzes the link budget considerations that arise from the above 
conclusions and some numerical results are presented for the SINCGARS case. 
 
C. LINK BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. Transmitter/Jammer 
It was seen that hcP  is dependent upon the SNR received by the determinator, 
which in turn is dependent upon the transmitted power tP , the distance 2D , the transmit-
ter’s gain tjG  in the direction of the jammer, the bit rate bR , and the receive sensitivity of 
the jammer senR . 
The levels of 0sfE N  that would be affected by the various distances and gains 
can be obtained with a few simplifying assumptions. The transmitter usually transmits 
with the same gain in all directions on the battlefield. That is, the transmitter’s pattern is 
omni directional ( 1tjG = ). It is assumed that there is no multipath fading in the channel 







π =    . (6.18) 
The SNR at the / 146AN USQ−  jammer is given by 
 2
0
log ( )sf t sen s
c b
E M EIRP R T
N L kR
⋅ ⋅ ⋅= , (6.19) 
where tEIRP  is the effective radiated power of the transmitter, sT  is the system equiva-
lent noise temperature, and k is the Boltzmann constant. The tEIRP  is the product of the 
transmitted power with the gain of the transmitted antenna. 
 t t tEIRP PG= . (6.20) 
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The system equivalent noise temperature is 
 s A eT T T= + , (6.21) 
where AT  is the effective noise temperature of the jammer’s receive antenna and eT  is the 
equivalent noise temperature. For terrestrial communication o290 KAT =  and 
 0 ( 1)eT T F= − , (6.22) 
where o0 290 K,T =  and F  is the noise figure of the jammer. The / 146AN USQ−  jammer 
has 18 dB.F =  Replacing the above values in (6.22) gives o18007.8 KeT =  and there-
fore o18297.8 K.sT =  





sf t t sen s
b
E M PG R T
N D f kR
c
π=    
. (6.23) 
Equation (6.23) shows that the distance strongly influences the signal loss. For example, 
if the distance between the jammer and the receiver is doubled, the jammer must quadru-
ple its output for the jamming to be effective. 
The above observation forces the follower jammer to check if the distance 2D , 
which is determined by the boundary ellipse, influences the signal strength dramatically. 
If this is the case, the determinator and jamming transmitter is co-located in a smaller dis-
tance ( )2D . For example, as noted in Figure 27,  in order for the / 146AN USQ −  jammer 








From [8] the tEIRP  of the SINCGARS transmitter is 0 dBW. The bit rate is 
16000 bits/s.  The transmitted frequencies f  are in the range of 30-MHz to 88-MHz.  
From [1] the receive sensitivity of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer is 95 dBm.−  
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Keeping the distance 2D  as a variable, Figure 28  illustrates the relationship be-
tween 0sfE N  and distance 2D  for the maximum and minimum value of the frequency 
that a SINCGARS system can hop. 
 























FH / B FSK 
FH / 4 FSK 
FH / 8 FSK 
 
Figure 28.   Received SNR by the Determinator in SINCGARS Case for Various 2D  
 
The plot of 0sfE N  in Figure 28  states that the worst case is for FH/BFSK. In 
this case, when the hop frequency is achieving its maximum value, the determinator must 
be at a distance smaller than 45 km.  This distance certifies that the determinator of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer will receive any type of FH/MFSK system with a 0 0.4 dB,sfE N ≥  
which is the value of the SNR that the determinator must receive in order to give a 
0.5hcP = . 
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In all the above, the determinator and the jammer transmitter is co-located in a 
boundary cycle with radius 2 45 km.D =  Comparing this to the value of 2 1500 km,D =  
which was derived from Chapter V, one can conclude that in order to determine with 
great probability the right hop frequency the follower jammer must approach the trans-
mitter at a distance 33  times smaller than the required distance, which was based on the 
value of the system’s hop rate. 
To clarify the influence that the above result has in the distance of the jammer 
from the area of interest, Figure 29  shows the previous and the new boundary surface of 
the jammer for 100 hops/s.hR =  The comparison in the figure indicates that the specifica-
tions of the determinator are the primary factors for the operational distance of the jam-











Figure 29.   Comparison of Boundary Surface of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer for 





The above result is not valid for all types of FH systems. Due to the fact that 
Equations (6.15) and (6.23) do not depend on hR  but on the bR , ssW , and tP  of the com-
munication system, for a FH system with 2000 hops/s,hR   the specifications of the de-
terminator may not change its boundary surface. For example, if a FH system has 
10000 hops/shR =  and all other characteristics are the same as the SINCGARS system, 
then the boundary surface of the jammer will not be influenced. 
 
2. Jammer/Receiver 
Up to this point only the restrictions of the distance 2D  have been examined. For 
the distance 3D , that is, the maximum effective jammer distance from the receiver, the 
upper limit must also be evaluated. For the / 146AN USQ −  jammer, the value of the sig-












   ≤ −      
, (6.24) 
where IP  is the total jammer power in ssW , cP  is the average signal power in the W , 
0bE N  corresponds to the specific BER for the modulation scheme, and ( )rec dBPG  is the 
receiver’s processing gain. The worst case situation is when the inequality becomes an 
equality. 
For the SINCGARS receiver, the processing gain is 
 ( ) ( )rec dB 10log 10log 33.7 dB.ssWPG NW
 = = =    (6.25) 
Assuming that the jammer wants to achieve four specific probabilities of bit error, 
for example 310 ,−  210 ,−  110−  and 0.5,  then based on Equation (4.11) the corresponding 






( ) ( )0 req dBbE N  
bP  
2M =  4M =  8M =  
310−  11 8.5  7.2  
210−  9.22  7.21  6.21  
110−  6.1  4.54  3.91 
0.5  0  0  0  
Table 8.   Required Signal-to-Noise ratio Depending on the Desired bP  
For each case of ,bP  taking the worst case for the jammer, which is when 8M = , 
Equation (6.24) gives the results in Table 9 . 
 
bP  310−  210−  110−  0.5  
( ) ( )req dBI cP P  26.5  27.49  29.79  33.7  
Table 9.   Corresponding Values of ( ) ( )req dBI cP P  
 










−    =          
, (6.26) 
where ,cjL  ctL  are the free space losses. The receiver antenna gains and miscellaneous 
losses (atmosphere, rain, pointing error) are assumed the same for both links and there-













As noted in Chapter II, the jEIRP  of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer for the case of a 
system like SINCGARS is 30 dBW. From [8] the tEIRP  of the SINCGARS transmitter 
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  = =    = =    =       = =     = =    
 (6.28) 
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 =  =  = =    =     =
 (6.29) 
The maximum distance at which the transmitter and the receiver of the 
SINCGARS system can establish reliable communication is 1 40 km.D =  In this case the 





60 km     for 10
52 km     for 10
40.8 km  for 10













 = ==  = =
 (6.30) 
The above results specify the distances that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer must have from 
the receiver in order to perform a probability of bit error close to 310 ,−  210 ,−  110−  and 
0.5  respectfully in any FH/MFSK system with 2,4M = or 8.  The results of (6.30) indi-
cate that for the case of 0.5bP =  the jammer approaches the receiver at a distance ( )3D  
closer than the distance between the transmitter and the receiver ( )2 .D  However, this dis-
tance is considered to be secure enough for the jammer. 
 
79 
At this point both the maximum distance of the jammer from the transmitter and 
the maximum distance of the jammer from the receiver have been evaluated. In order to 
find the optimum position of the jammer two circles with a radius 2D  and 3D  respec-
tively must be drawn. The first circle will have as a center the position of the transmitter 
and the second circle the position of the receiver. The intersection of the two circles is the 
area in which the jammer can operate with a probability of a correct determination that 
equals to 0.5  and a BER equal to 310 ,−  210 ,−  110−  or 0.5.  
 
Figure 30.   Optimum Position of / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in a SINCGARS System 
 
As Figure 30  indicates, the best position of the jammer in each of the four inter-
sected operational areas is the positions, 1 2 3, ,A A A  and 4A  respectfully. In these positions 
the jammer is at the furthest point from both the transmitter and the receiver. The y  co-
ordinates of the 1 2 3, ,A A A  and 4A  points give the optimum height that the jammer can 
operate. Observing the values of 1 2 3, ,H H H  and 4H  in the Figure 30  it becomes obvious 
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that in order for the jammer to achieve higher values of bP  it must approach the hostile 
communication system at a shorter distance. For the above example the jammer, in order 
to increase the probability of bit error from 310−  to 0.5,  must lower the height from 
1 45 kmH =  to 1 26.18 km.H =  
The jammer along with the transmitter and the receiver create a triangle with sides 
the distances 1 2,D D  and 3.D  Considering that the distance between the transmitter and 
the receiver is a variable, the other two sides of the triangle can be determined from the 
jammer based on the previous link budget analysis. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
Reviewing the main points of this chapter, it is important to emphasize the influ-
ence of the determinator on the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in reactive 
jamming. From the above analysis, it was shown that the determinator of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer can determine which segment contains the frequency hop of a 
FH system with 0.5.hcP =  The restriction that the jammer has in order to achieve such a 
performance is that it must be at a proper distance from the transmitter. This restriction 
does not depend on the hopping rate of the system but on the bit rate, the received spread 
band, and the transmitted power of the system. 
The next important factor is the output power of the jammer, which determines 
the distance of the jammer from the receiver. The output power of the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer varies based on the operational bandwidth and can be considered as sufficient 
enough on the modern battlefield. 
Before starting to operate as a follower jammer the / 146AN USQ −  jammer must 
estimate three distances: its boundary ellipse, the proper distance that the determinator 
requires, and its distance from the receiver. The first distance depends on the hR , the sec-
ond distance on the ssW , bR , and tP  of the FH system, and the third distance on the out-
put power of the jammer and the BER that it wants to invoke in the system. Designating 
the shortest distance between the first two distances as distance 2 ,D  and the third as dis-
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tance 3,D  the jammer is confident about operating successfully as a follower jammer. 
The distance 3D  is influenced by the desired BER. Specifically for the case of the 
SINCGARS system, in order for the jammer to achieve 0.5bP =  it must approach the re-
ceiver of the communication scheme in a distance shorter than the distance between the 
transmitter and the receiver. 
The next chapter discusses the performance of the jammer in FH/MFSK systems 
using various types of jamming in reactive jamming mode. It is assumed that the jammer 
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VII. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER IN 
VARIOUS METHODS OF REACTIVE JAMMING 
This chapter investigates the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in the 
repeat mode jamming. It is assumed that the jammer has considered all the limitations 
that were presented in the previous two chapters and operates inside the geometrical 
zone, which ensures the determinator’s performance with a probability of a correct de-
termination of 0.5.hcP =  
The three most important strategies that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer uses when it 
operates as follower jammer are the noise repeat jamming, the partial-band Gaussian 
noise repeat jamming, and the follower tone jamming. The following sections analyze the 
performance of each of the three strategies, in an uncoded slow FH/MFSK system, and 
the results are compared with the results presented in Chapter IV in which the 
/ 146AN USQ −  was operating with the same strategies in the manual spot mode. 
 
A. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER USING NOISE 
REPEAT JAMMING IN A FH/MFSK SYSTEM 
Because of the differential geometrical delay, ( )2 3 1T D D D c∆ = + −  and the 
sampling delay wT , the / 146AN USQ −  jammer will jam only the final section, 
( )h wT T T− ∆ +  of the hop, provided ( ) 0h wT T T− ∆ + > . 
Let the average total jamming power be .IP  This jamming power is transmitted 
for time ,hT  and is spread over the jamming band .jW  Furthermore, the receiver inte-
grates over hT  so that the effective jamming power, on those hops correctly determined, 
is reduced by the factor ( ) .h w hT T T T− ∆ +    Thus the effective jamming noise power 
density as seen at the receiver is 




− ∆ += ⋅ . (7.1) 
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= . (7.2) 
Also, .r st orSNR E N=  Let the probability of symbol error as a function of SNR and SJR 
be ,sP  which is given by (4.8). Then the total error probability is 
 ( )1st ststot hc s hc s
oe or or
E EP P P P P
J N N
   = ⋅ + − ⋅   +   
. (7.3) 
Combining (4.8) and (7.3) results in 
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 − = ⋅ −   +  




Considering that the jammer fulfills all the requirements for repeat jamming and 
following the same assumptions for the SNR of the channel as in the previous analysis, 
Equation (7.4) becomes  
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  −  = ⋅ −  +    











The total probability of bit error is  
 
( ) ( )
















































Based on the conclusions in Chapter VI, in order for the / 146AN USQ −  to be able to 
jam a SINCGARS system with 0.5,hcP =  the received signal-to-noise ratio on the jam-















=  the (7.6) becomes 
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The above equation has as a variable the signal-to-jamming ratio at the receiver of the 
communication system and estimates the probability of bit error that the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer causes in the SINCGARS system when it is operating in noise follower jamming 
technique. 
The plot of Equation (7.7) for the cases of 2, 4,8M =  for the SINCGARS system 




















Figure 31.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Follower Noise Jamming on the Performance of 
a SINCGARS System in AWGN 
 
Figure 31 indicates that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer is very effective when it op-
erates in noise repeat mode. As the modulation order ( )M  of the communication system 
increases, the performance of the jammer decreases, especially for large values of SJR. 
This particular technique is the simplest follower jamming strategy that the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer can select to operate. In manual spot mode the corresponding 
technique is the barrage noise jamming. A comparison of these two cases can be seen in 




























Follower Noise Jamming 
Barrage Noise Jamming 
AWGN 
 
Figure 32.   Comparison of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Noise Follower and Barrage 
Noise Jamming Techniques on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN 
 
Figure 32  is the combination of Figures 13  and 31.  The study of Figure 32  veri-
fies that the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in repeat mode has increased 
dramatically. The most important observation is that the noise follower jammer achieves 
a probability of bit error in the range of 0.5  with 30 dB  less energy than the barrage 
noise technique. As an example, for the case of the FH/4FSK, the jammer for 
0 dBb IE N =  causes a 0.5.bP ≈  On the other hand, for the same level of interference, 
the bP  for barrage noise jamming is 
910 .bP
−=  
The next section analyzes a more complicated but also more effective type of re-
peat jamming. This is the partial-band Gaussian noise follower jamming technique, 
which is investigated for two types of FH/MFSK communication modes. 
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B. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER USING FOLLOWER 




The system model that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer jams is a FH/MFSK system 
with N  frequency slots. The transmitter, the receiver, and the channel are described in 
the following sections. 
 
a. Transmitter/Receiver 
Based on [9], during each signaling interval, the transmitter/receiver oper-
ates in one of the two modes, conventional or unconventional. The conventional mode is 
selected by the transmitter and the receiver pseudorandomly with a probability .cp  In this 
case, the transmitter transmits one of M  tones of duration ,T  and 2log ( )M  bits are con-
veyed. The receiver consists of a dehopper followed by noncoherent match filters. The 
filter corresponding to the largest output is taken to be the transmitted symbol. 
The unconventional mode is selected with probability 1 .cp−  In this case 
the transmitter randomly chooses one of the M  tones and transmits it in one of the 
r N≤  frequency slots, where the set of r  frequency slots are selected pseudorandomly. 
The M  tones that are transmitted do not carry any information, but it is the presence or 
absence of energy in the r  selected frequency slots that do convey information. In this 
case, 2log ( )r  information bits are transmitted. 
The choice of r  depends on the system tradeoffs (usually data rate, com-
plexity, and throughput). A common assumption is to set .r M=  The receiver consists of 
a bank of radiometers measuring the energy in the r  frequency slots. The slot with the 
largest energy is chosen as the transmitted symbol. Figure 33  shows a time-frequency 
























C: Conventional Mode 
U: Unconventional Mode 
 
Figure 33.   Time-Frequency Diagram of the Conventional-Unconventional Frequency Hop-
ping System [After Ref. 9] 
 
The above figure illustrates the case where 2.M r= =  The solid tones 
represent the transmitted sequence whereas the dash tones represent the binary compli-
ment. Notice that in the unconventional mode two dashed tones are shown indicating that 
it does not matter which tones are chosen in that channel. 
 
b. Channel 
The / 146AN USQ −  jammer interferes with the communication system in 
the repeat partial-band Gaussian noise jamming mode. As mentioned previously, ssW  is 
the total spread spectrum bandwidth, and IP  is the total power available to the follower 





= . (7.8) 






INN ρ= , (7.9) 





=  (7.10) 
Two modes of operation are also available to the / 146AN USQ−  jammer, 
conventional and unconventional. The jammer chooses to operate in the conventional 
mode with probability .jp  In this case the jammer injects all its power in the transmit-
ter’s hop. The unconventional mode is chosen with a probability 1 .jp−  In this case, the 
jammer does not jam the transmitter’s hop, but randomly jams a subset of the other 1N −  
frequency slots. Note that the jammer randomizes its decision based on its knowledge of 
the communication system. 
It is obvious that in this channel the worst case for the jammer is when the 
transmitter is operating in the unconventional mode and the jammer selects the conven-
tional mode. In this case, the jammer is helping the communicator by adding more energy 
into its frequency slot. This event occurs with a certain probability, and its effect im-
proves the system’s performance rather than degrades it. 
 
2. Performance Evaluation 
Let cZ  be a random variable that takes values in { }0,1  such that 0,cZ =  which 
indicates that the transmitter/receiver are in conventional mode, and 1cZ =  indicates the 
unconventional mode. Similarly, 
 
0 if the jammer is in conventional mode
1 if the jammer is in unconventional mode.j
Z =   (7.11) 
Also let sE  be the event that an information symbol is in the error, and let bP  be the bit 
error rate. Then 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
,
| , ,s s c j c j
i j
P E P E Z i Z j P Z i Z j= = = ⋅ = =∑ . (7.12) 
It is assumed that jZ  and cZ  are independent random variables. Thus, 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ),c j c jP Z i Z j P Z i P Z j= = = = ⋅ = , (7.13) 
where ( ) ( )0 1 1c c cP Z P Z p= = − = =  and ( ) ( )0 1 1 .j j jP Z P Z p= = − = =  
Consider first the case of both the communicator and jammer operating in con-
ventional modes ( )0 .c jZ Z= =  Based on Equation (7.10), the Gaussian jamming noise 
density in the one slot jammed ( )1s =  is ,I IN N N′ = ⋅  and the resulting error probability 
with non-coherent reception is the same as Equation (4.8) but with 0o IN N N′= +  or 





















− −− +    − +   +   
=
− = −  + ∑ . (7.14) 
Next consider the case of the conventional mode for the communicator and un-
conventional mode for the jammer, and vise versa. In these two cases, the error is caused 
only by the AWGN in the channel with result 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0log( )1 1 1
1




s c j s c j
n
M




− = = = = = = −  + ∑  (7.15) 
Finally consider the unconventional mode for both the communicator and jammer. In this 
case, the receiver uses an energy detector or a radiometer to decide on the hop used (rep-
resenting the M-ary symbol). If the jammer signal ( )j t  hops into one of these M  fre-
quency slots, the input to the radiometer is a stationary Gaussian process with double-
sided power spectral density 
 
2 2 2
I I IN N NN
sρ
′ = = , (7.16) 
where s  is the number of frequency slots jammed. In this case the output of the energy 





U j t dt= ∫  (7.17) 
It can be seen from [5] that the probability density function of U  is given by 
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 ( ) ( )
1'
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2 1 , 02 ( 1)!











 >=  −
 (7.18) 
Obviously, the output of the energy detector when only the transmitted signal is present is 
( )2log .s bE MΓ =  
Let ( )jH  be the event that the jammer hops into exactly j  of the transmitter’s set 
of M  designated frequency slots. Note that j  must be less than N  since the jammer, in 
the nonconventional mode, does not jam the hop being used by the transmitter. Also, j  
must be at least 1; otherwise, the jammer does not transmit at all and the error probability 
will be zero. 
The output of the radiometers affected by the jammer is a sequence of independ-
ent and identical distributed random variables { }1 2, ,..., .jU U U  Then 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )min( 1, )
1
| 1, 1 | 1, 1,
M s
j j
s c j s c j
j
P E Z Z P E Z Z H P H
−
=
= = = = = ⋅∑ , (7.19) 
where 
 ( )( ) '| 1, 1, 1j bs c j j
I
EP E Z Z H f
N
 = = = −   
, (7.20) 
and as [9] shows 
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Also a simple combinational argument shows 
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. (7.22) 
Therefore, the symbol error rate is given by 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1s c j c j c j j cP E p p p p p p p pα β γ δ= ⋅ + ⋅ − − + ⋅ − + ⋅ − , (7.23) 
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= − . (7.25) 
In Equation (7.23) the only term that depend on s  is β . The jammer then has to numeri-
cally choose s  to maximize β  and therefore maximize bP  for a fixed .b IE N  Assuming 
that ,N s  are very large numbers, the ratio N s  becomes finite. In this situation Stirling’s 
approximation can be used to arrive at 
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where s Nρ = . Using this approximation in Equation (7.24) yields 
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Equation (7.28) can be simplified to 
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Reference [9] shows that the form of Equation (7.29) has a unique maximum with 
respect to ,ρ  which is 
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The resulting form for β  is  
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Table 10.   Constants Used to Determine β  
 
Statistical unclassified information for the / 146AN USQ−  jammer indicates that the 
jammer prefers to choose its strategy jp  based on its knowledge of .cp  In this case, the 
solution to the problem is max min ( , ).
j cp p j c
P p p  The following theorem is proven in 
Reference [ ]9 . 
Theorem: 
 max min ( , ) min max ( , )
j c j cp p j c p p j c
P p p P p p αβα γ β= = − + , (7.35) 
where  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ), 1 1 1c j c j c j j cP p p p p p p p pα β γ= ⋅ + ⋅ − − + ⋅ − . (7.36) 
Rearranging the terms in Equation (7.23), the symbol error probability becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 .s c j c jP E p p p pα γ β γ= − ⋅ + ⋅ − − +  (7.37) 
The implementation of the previous theorem in Equation (7.37) gives 
 ( )2max min ( , ) max min ( ) .
2j c j cp p j c p p s
P p p P E
α γ β γα γ β
−= = +− +  (7.38) 
Based on (7.25), the probability of the bit error is 
 ( )2max min ( , ) .
2( 1) 2j cp p b j c
MP p p
M
α γ β γα γ β
− = ⋅ + − − + 
 (7.39) 














2  1.618  0.8399  
4  1.473  0.9712  
8  1.935  1.49  
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As proven in Chapter VI, the probability of correct determination ( )hcP  of the 
jammer when it is at the proper distance ( )2D  is 0.5.  So the total probability of error in 
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α γ β γα γ β
− = ⋅ + − − + 
 (7.40) 
As mentioned before, a  is given by Equation (7.14), β  for the worst case ρ  is given by 
Equation (7.34), and γ  is replaced by Equation (7.15). 
The parameters that Equation (7.40) depends on are the signal-to-jammer noise 
ratio ,b IE N  the signal-to-noise ratio of the channel 0 ,bE N  the modulation order of the 
communication system ,M  and the number of hop bins .N  
In Figure 34 , the probability of bit error that the / 146AN USQ−  jammer causes is 
plotted, in a FH/MFSK system when it operates as a follower partial-band noise jammer 
with the maximum probability for the conventional mode and the minimum for the un-
conventional mode. The communication system is the SINCGARS ( )2320 ,N =  the sig-
nal-to-noise ratio is 0 13.35 dB,bE N =  and the horizontal axis is the .b IE N  
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Figure 34.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Repeat Partial-Band Jamming on the Perform-
ance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN 
 
Observing the above figure, it is apparent that whenever the jammer can maxi-
mize jp  based on the knowledge of ,cp  its ability to interfere in a communication sys-
tem by using repeat partial-band jamming improves. The problem for the jammer is de-
termining the communicator’s operational mode. Each time the jammer cannot accurately 
conclude the mode of operation of the system, it causes no error to the communication. 
That is, the AWGN becomes the only source of interference to the system. The unclassi-
fied sources that were used for this thesis do not refer to the way that the jammer decides 
the operational mode that it will use. When the jammer decides correctly, the probability 
of the bit error is given in Equation (7.40). On the other hand, when the jammer does not 
decide correctly, the probability of error is negligible. 
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Based on the above conclusions, a good strategy for the jammer is to use the fol-
lower partial-band jamming technique only when it is sure about the operational mode of 
the communicator. Otherwise jamming with the noise follower jamming technique is bet-
ter. 
Comparing the above two types of jamming, it is clear that the follower partial-
band jamming is more effective than the noise follower jamming. In addition, the fol-
lower partial-band jammer is also more effective than the PBJ in manual spot jamming. 
The problem appears when the jammer fails to decide correctly. In this case, the jammer 
does not influence the communication system. 
As Figure 35  verifies, the only type of jamming that is competitive with the fol-
lower PBJ, until this point, is the multitone manual spot jamming. For small values of 
signal-to-interference noise ratio, the manual spot multitone jamming appears to perform 
better than the repeat PBJ. On the other hand, as the signal power increases the perform-
ance of the repeat partial-band, jamming improves its effectiveness, particularly for the 
case of 8.M =  
The disadvantage of the multitone manual spot jamming, as mentioned in Chapter 
IV is the lack of any sufficient information about the actual hop frequency. The operator 
is based only on statistical data that are provided by the jammer’s software in order to 
specify the spread bandwidth. This information can only give the jammer a speculation of 
what the proper transmitted power of the jamming tones is. 
Balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the two most powerful types of 
jamming that have been investigated until now, it is valid to say that the follower PBJ is 
more preferable for the interference of a FH system. This conclusion is based on the fact 
that the jammer in the repeat mode can guarantee a probability of correct determination 
of the frequency hop close to 0.5.  On the other hand, in manual spot jamming, the prob-
ability of correct determination of the spread bandwidth, and not the frequency hop, is a 
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Figure 35.   Comparison of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Follower Partial-
Band, Follower Noise and Multitone Manual Spot Jamming on the Performance of a 
SINCGARS System in AWGN 
 
The next section investigates the last and most effective jamming technique of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer. This is the optimal follower tone jamming, with the jammer al-







C. PERFORMANCE OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER USING OPTIMAL 
FOLLOWER TONE-JAMMING IN A FH/MFSK SYSTEM 
This section discusses the effect of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer when it operates 
as a follower multitone jammer. The analysis below concludes that the optimum follower 
tone jammer strategy is to transmit either one or two tones in a frequency channel, de-
pending on the mode of transmission. 
 
1. Introduction 
The communication system is again a slow FH/MFSK system with N  frequency 
channels available for hopping. Each channel can be considered as a group of M  tones. 
That is, the communicator has N M⋅  available tones. In the slow frequency hopping 
more than one M-ary symbol are transmitted prior to each frequency hop. 
 
a. Transmitter/Receiver 
As stated in the previous section, for each signaling interval, the transmit-
ter/receiver operates in one of two modes: conventional or unconventional. 
In the conventional mode, the transmitter transmits one of M  tones within 
the corresponding channel (i.e., within one of the N  channels). The receiver consists of a 
dehopper followed by M  noncoherent matched filters. The filter corresponding to the 
largest output is taken to be the transmitted symbol. 
In the unconventional mode, the transmitter randomly chooses one of the 
M  tones and transmits it to one of M  channels, where the M  channels are selected 
pseudorandomly. Notice that the M  tones do not carry any information, but it is the pres-
ence or absence of energy in the M  channels that conveys information. The receiver 
looks at the whole of each M  channel and consists of an energy detector, which may be 
a compressive receiver or a bank of M  independent radiometers. The channel with the 







In this case the source of interference for the channel is the transmission of 
q  tones by the / 146AN USQ−  jammer. The power of each tone is large enough to domi-
nate a communicator’s tone. Based on [1] and [10], the / 146AN USQ −  jammer can in-
ject multiple tones per channel if it chooses. Due to this capability, the jammer has two 
modes of operation: conventional and unconventional. 
In the conventional mode, the jammer injects a single tone in the transmit-
ters channel and transmits the other 1q −  tones in 1s q≤ −  distinct and randomly chosen 
channels. In the unconventional mode, the jammer does not jam the transmitter’s channel 
but randomly distributes its q  tones over the other 1s −  distinct channels so that each 
channel has at most one interfering tone. 
In the above general description of the channel and in the performance 
evaluation that follows, the number of the output tones by the jammer q  is considered to 
be unknown. When the analysis leads to a general result, the variable q  will be replaced 
by the actual number of tones that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer can produce. 
 
2. Performance Evaluation 
The output power of the multitone jammer is IP , and it transmits a tone with just 
enough power to exceed that of the transmitter’s power. If the communicator’s power at 





= . (7.41) 
Based on Equations (4.36), (7.8) and the fact that the power at the receiver is 
 c b bP E R= , (7.42) 
Equation (7.41) becomes 
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+ ⋅=  (7.43) 
Following the same steps as in the partial-band follower jamming, the cZ  random 
variable indicates whether the transmitter/receiver operates in conventional or unconven-
tional mode. Mathematically this corresponds 
 
0 if the transmitter and receiver is in conventional mode
1 if the transmitter and receiver is in unconventional mode.c
Z =   
Similarly,  
 
0 if the jammer is in conventional mode
1 if the jammer is in unconventional mode.j
Z =   
Again, sE  is the event that an information symbol is in error. Then 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
,
| , , .s s c j c j
i j
P E P E Z i Z j P Z i Z j= = = ⋅ = =∑  
The transmitter/receiver selects to operate in the conventional mode with the probability 
cp  and the jammer with a probability jp . Then ( ) ( )0 1 1c c cP Z P Z p= = − = = , 
( ) ( )0 1 1 ,j j jP Z P Z p= = − = =  and 
 ( )| 0, 0 1s c jP E Z Z= = = . (7.44) 
Next consider the case of the conventional mode for the communicator and un-
conventional mode for the jammer. In this case the error is caused only by the AWGN in 
the channel, so 
 ( ) ( ) 0log( )1 1 1
1











− = = = −  + ∑ . (7.45) 
As mentioned in [ ]10 ,  an optimal conventional jammer will follow the transmit-
ter’s tone by injecting one tone in the complimentary channel and randomly distributes 
the remaining 1q −  tones among 1
2
q −     channels with exactly two tones per channel. In 
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this case ( ) ( )| 1, 0 | 0, 1s c j s c jP E Z Z P E Z Z= = ≠ = = , since the two tones, with a finite 
probability, can coincide with one of the transmitter’s unconventional channels. 
The two tones are optimal and more tones would be a waste of the jammer’s en-
ergy. Equivalently, the jammer can use one tone with slightly more than twice the power 
of the communicator’s tone. Since the mathematical model gives the same results 
whether the jammer uses either of these methods, the next analysis assumes that the 
jammer sends two tones in the remaining ( )1 2q −    channels. 
Let ( ) ( )| 1, 1s c jPh q P E Z Z= = = . In addition, as Reference [ ]10  indicates, 
( )Ph q  is the probability that the jammer hits at least one of the 1M −  remaining signal-
ing channels. 
 ( ) 1
11 1 if 1
1      if 1.
q
i
M q N M
Ph q N i
q N M
=
 − − − ≤ − +  = −  > − +
∏  (7.46) 
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qP E Z Z Ph −  = = =      . (7.48) 
Based on (7.44), (7.45), (7.46), and (7.48) the symbol error rate is given by 
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The corresponding bit error probability ( )bP  is then, 
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. (7.50) 
Equation (7.50) is in the same form as Equation (7.23). This time 
1α = , ( )Ph qβ = , 1
2












δ − −+ +
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− = −  + ∑ . Based 
on the theorem in Section . .2VII B , 
 max min ( , )
2( 1)j cp p b j c
M aP p p
M
β
α γ β= ⋅− − + . (7.51) 
As proven in Chapter VI, the probability of the correct determination ( )hcP  of the 
jammer when it is in the proper distance ( )2D  is 0.5.  The total probability of error in the 
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αβ δα γ β
 = ⋅ + − − +  . (7.52) 
The parameters that Equation (7.52) depends on are the signal-to-jammer noise ratio 
,b IE N  the signal-to-noise ratio of the channel 0 ,bE N  the modulation order of the 
communication system ,M  and the number of hop bins .N  Figure 36  presents the plot 





















Figure 36.   Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Follower Multitone Jamming on the Per-
formance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN 
 
The above figure indicates that, as mentioned in the case of the multitone manual 
spot jamming, the performance of the communication system becomes inversely propor-
tional to the modulation order. This phenomenon occurs due to the influence of Equation 
(7.47) in Equation (7.52). As the signal-to-interference noise ratio increases, Equation 
(7.47) becomes equal to its upper branch. The upper branch represents the probability 
that the jammer hits at least one of the 1M −  remaining signaling channels when both the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer and communication system operate in the unconventional mode. 
It is also obvious that as M  increases, the probability that the jammer will hit one of the 
1M −  channels increases. 
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The three equivalent output tones of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in follower mul-
titone jamming produce a signal-to-interference jamming ratio that depends on the modu-
lation order .M  A rearrangement of the terms in Equation (7.43) gives 








+ ⋅=  (7.53) 







2  33.65  
4  32.86  
8  33.65  
Table 11.   Produced b IE N  from the / 146AN USQ−  Jammer in Follower Multitone Jamming 
Technique 
 
As Figure 36  indicates for the above values of ,b IE N  the / 146AN USQ−  jammer 
achieves a probability of bit error between 46.5 10−×  and 32.3 10 .−×  
For the same values of b IE N  that the above table lists, the follower PBJ tech-
nique produces a bit error near 510 .−  That is, the follower multitone jamming technique 
improves the jammer performance to nearly 20 dB. In addition, compared to the multi-
tone manual spot jamming, there is an improvement of 10  to 15 dB.  
However, the follower multitone jamming technique can achieve a bit error rate in 
the range of 0.5  ( )0 dB ,b IE N =  if the jammer can increases its output power per jam-
ming tone. Based on Equation (7.53), the necessary increase of the output jamming 





Necessary Increase of Output 
Power Per Jamming Tone for 
0.5bP =  
2  38.42 dB  
4  37.63 dB  
8  38.42 dB  
Table 12.   Necessary Increase of the Follower Multitone Output Power Per Jamming Tone 
for 0.5bP =  
 
Based on the conclusions in the previous section, the plot of Equation (7.52) must 
be compared with the two most prevailed performances of the jammer. That is, the fol-
lower PBJ and in multitone manual spot jamming. Figure 37  illustrates the performance 
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Figure 37.   Comparison of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Follower Multitone, 
Follower Partial-Band and Multitone Manual Spot Jamming on the Performance of a 
SINCGARS System in AWGN 
 
The above figure shows the superiority of the follower multitone technique 
against the two other techniques. For small values of /b IE N  the performances of the 
manual mode and follower multitone are similar enough, but as the signal-to-jamming 
ratio increases the follower multitone technique presents a 8 10 dB−  greater degradation 
in the hostile communication system regardless of the modulation order. On the other 
hand, the performance of the follower partial-band jamming for small values of /b IE N  is 
clearly worse than the two other techniques. However as the /b IE N  increases, the repeat 
partial-band jamming improves its performance against the manual spot multitone jam-
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ming. Specifically, for values of signal-to-interference noise ratio greater than 10 dB,  the 
follower PBJ performs 5 10 dB−  better than the manual spot multitone technique. 
At this point is important to emphasize that the manual spot multitone jamming 
technique achieves the specific performance under certain conditions, which were ana-
lyzed in this chapter. As a result, most of the times the follower PBJ is preferable to man-
ual spot multitone jamming. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
Based on the above results, it can be concluded that the best jamming technique 
that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer must follow when it is interested in a FH/MFSK system 
is the follower multitone jamming. This result was expected since in this specific mode of 
operation, the jammer is using its output power and the determinator’s decision most effi-
ciently. 
The second most effective technique is the repeat partial-band noise jamming. 
Even though the results of the multitone manual spot jamming are better for small values 
of SJR, the fact that its performance is influenced by many external factors, such as the 
operator’s experience and the observation time of the system by the jammer, make the 
repeat partial-band noise jamming a more preferable jamming strategy. 
This chapter concludes the theoretical analysis for the / 146AN USQ −  jammer, 
and the sub-sequential step is verifying the outgoing results from this analysis through a 
simulation environment. 
Chapter VIII introduces the creation of two simulation environments. The first 
one is a FH system identical to the SINCGARS communication system, which will verify 
the results in Chapters IV and VII. The second simulation environment is the IEEE 
802.11a  wireless local area network (WLAN) system, which is used to investigate the 
capabilities of the manual spot jamming mode of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in a non-





VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER 
PERFORMANCE IN TWO TYPES OF COMMUNICATION 
SYSTEMS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present simulation results for the / 146AN USQ−  
jammer operating on two types of communication systems. The first communication sys-
tem is the SINCGARS frequency hopping communication system. In this environment, 
the jammer is simulated to perform in manual spot mode and in repeat mode for all types 
of jamming. For every case, the probability of bit error due to jamming is measured, and 
a comparison with the corresponding theoretical result is presented. 
The second communication system is the IEEE 802.11a  Standard WLAN system. 
This commercial communication system has an orthogonal frequency division multiplex-
ing (OFDM) scheme. The purpose of this simulation is to investigate the performance of 
the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in a non-FH commercial system. In this case, since the sys-
tem does not hop frequencies, the jammer is simulated only in manual spot jamming 
mode. 
All the simulations were created with the help of a relatively new software pack-
age, which is called SystemView. 
 
A. SIMULATION OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER PERFORMANCE IN A 
SINCGARS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
This section describes the simulation of the SINCGARS communication system 
as performed in SystemView by Elanix. This simulation scheme is used as a platform 
upon which each type of jamming is represented by adding the appropriate blocks (to-
kens). These tokens reflect the specifications and the operational characteristics of the 







1. SINCGARS Simulation Model 
The overall block diagram of the SINCGARS communication system is shown in 
Figure 38 . 
 
Figure 38.   SINCGARS Simulation Scheme 
 
The 16 kbps  data source (token 0)  is first modulated in the MFSK modulator (to-
ken 4).  The modulated signal with bandwidth 25  kHzW =  is multiplied by the output of 
the frequency synthesizer (token 16).  The frequency synthesizer consists of a numerical 
controlled oscillator (token 16) and a PN code (token 15).  The PN code produces the 
2320  frequencies of the FH system with a rate 100 hops/s.hR =  Token 13  represents the 
spread bandwidth of the SINCGARS system, which is 88 MHz 30 MHz 58 MHz.ssW = − =   
As assumed in the theoretical analysis, the noise of the channel is modeled as 
AWGN with signal-to-noise ratio equal to 0 13.35 dB.bE N =  Token 6  represents the 
additive Gaussian noise in the channel. 
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Considering perfect synchronization, the frequency synthesizer (token 20)  at the 
receiver is driven by the same PN code (token 15)  as it is used in the transmitter. The 
multiplication in token 7  succeeds the perfect dehopping of the signal. The dehopped 
signal is completely filtered out by the bandpass filter (token 14),  and it passes through 
the MFSK demodulator (token 8)  to extract the data. Finally token 10  compares the 
transmitted data with the received data and extracts the probability of the bit error of the 
system. The modulation order of the system and the symbol rate are parameters that can 
be adjusted by the tokens 4  and 10.  The number of samples that will pass from the sys-
tem, the sample rate, the variable token and the number of system loops can be arranged 
from the system time specifications of the software. Before presenting the influence of 
the / 146AN USQ −  jammer model in different types of jamming, it is important to exam-
ine the above simulation under the effect of the AWGN only in order to verify that the 
SINCGARS model behaves as the theory predicts.  
 
2. SINCGARS Model in AWGN 
The simulation model of the SINCGARS system in AWGN is illustrated in Figure 
38.  Enabling token 12  as a variable token, the system is running for ten different, con-
tinuously decreasing values of noise power ( ) ,oN  which correspond to ten different, con-
tinuously increasing values of 0 .bE N  The simulation model was executed for the cases 
of 2,4M =  and 8.  
In order to verify that the above simulation model is a FH system with 2320  pos-
sible hops with a rate of 100 hops/s,  an oscilloscope is connected at the output of token 
13.  The output result on the oscilloscope window after 23.2 seconds can be seen in Fig-




Figure 39.   2320  Hop Bins in the Spread-Spectrum Bandwidth of SINCGARS 
 
When observing the above figure, it is apparent that the communication system is 
a FH system with 2320,N =  its spread bandwidth is 58 MHzssW =  and its hop rate is 
100 hops/s.hR =  After the above verification, the simulation is executed. 
Figure 40  presents the simulated probabilities of bit error for the BFSK, 4FSK  
and 8FSK  cases, together with the corresponding theoretical results from Figure 10.  The 
results in Figure 40  verify that the simulation model behaves in AWGN as the theory 
























Figure 40.   Simulation of SINCGARS Performance in AWGN as Compared to Theoretical 
Curves 
 
The next step is to create the model of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in barrage noise 
jamming and observe its performance in the SINCGARS model. 
 
3. SINCGARS Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Bar-
rage Noise Jamming 
The source of interference that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer uses in barrage noise 
jamming is an AWGN with .I I ssN P W=  This interference is added in the channel to the 
thermal noise. 
Figure 41 illustrates the above, in which token 23 represents the noise source of 
the jammer and token 24  restricts the interference inside the operational bandwidth of 




Figure 41.   Barrage Noise Jamming Model of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in the 
SINCGARS System 
 
The noise of the channel is considered to be constant with 0 13.35 dB.bE N =  The 
parameter that varies in this simulation is the noise power of the jammer (token 23).  
In Figure 42,  with the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, the influence of 
the BNJ on the communication system can be observed. The upper part of the figure il-
lustrates the instantaneous frequency of the SINCGARS system together with the noise 










Figure 42.   Influence of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Barrage Noise Jamming Mode over 
the SINCGARS System 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the SystemView program estimates 
the probability of error by comparing the transmitted bit with the received one. The new-
est version of SystemView has the capability of transmitting in each loop at the most 312  
samples. That means that the lowest theoretical bP  that this software can calculate is in 
the range of 910 .−  If the error is less than 910 ,−  the system sets 0.bP =  
The results of the simulation for 2,4M =  and 8  are presented together with the 
theoretical curve in Figure 43.  
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Figure 43.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Barrage Noise Jam-
ming on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN as Compared to Theoreti-
cal Curves 
 
The results in Figure 43 verify that the simulation model behaves in BNJ as the 
theory predicts with small variations for small values of 0 .bE N  Due to restrictions of 




4. SINCGARS Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Worst 
Case Partial-Band Noise Jamming 
The simulation model in partial-band case is the same as in the BNJ model. The 
only difference exists in the token 24  which determines the part of the bandwidth that 
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will be jammed. As mentioned in the theoretical analysis, the jammer calculates the worst 
fraction of jammed bandwidth ( )wcρ  each time from Equation (4.32) before it jams. For 
the SINCGARS case, the only variable in Equation (4.32) is the .b IE N  
Even though the signal-to-interference power can be set as a variable, wcρ  cannot, 
since in the SystemView library there is no option for variable bandwidth filter. So the 
only possible procedure is to make one calculation with a given configuration for wcρ , 
save the results, and then change the value of ,b IE N  the value of the filter bandwidth 




AN/USQ -146 PARTIAL 
B AND JAMMING  
 
Figure 44.   Partial-Band Noise Jamming Model of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer over a 
SINCGARS System 
 
In Figure 45,  with the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, the influence of the 
jammer in the worst case PBJ in the communication system for a particular value of wcρ  
can be observed. The upper part of the figure illustrates the instantaneous frequency of 
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the SINCGARS system together with the noise signal. In the lower part, the partial-band 








Figure 45.   Influence of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Partial-Band Mode over the 
SINCGARS System 
 
At the specific instant that the above picture was taken, the jammer noise did not 
share the same bandwidth region with the signal, but when it did, an error occurred. The 
results of the above simulation for 2, 4, 8M =  together with the theoretical results are 
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Figure 46.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Worst Case Partial-
Band Jamming on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN as Compared to 
Theoretical Curves 
 
The results in Figure 46  verify that the simulation model behaves in PBJ as the 
theory predicts with small variations. The next step is to create the model of the 
/ 146AN USQ−  jammer in multitone noise jamming and observe its performance in the 
SINCGARS model. 
 
5. SINCGARS Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Multi-
tone Noise Jamming 
The simulation of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer interference in multitone jamming 
can be achieved by using one of the existing channel models in the SystemView library, 
which is called narrow band interferer ( ).NBI  
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This specific token generates unmodulated tones over a prescribed range. The de-
sired signal ( )x t  after the influence of the NBI  becomes 






y t x t A f tπ ϕ
=
= + +∑ , (8.1) 
where q  is the number of jamming tones. As mentioned in Chapter IV, for the case of the 
/ 146AN USQ−  jammer 2.q =  The phase kϕ  of each NBI  is distributed between 0  and 
2 .π  The amplitude kA  of each NBI  is distributed between specific values that the user 
can set. kA  is also the variable in this specific simulation model. The frequency kf  of 
each NBI  is chosen randomly over the communication bandwidth. 
Figure 47  represents the simulation model for the multitone manual spot jam-
ming case in which token 29  represents the influence of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer. 
 




In Figures 48  and 49,  with the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, the influ-
ence of the jammer in multitone jamming can be observed. In the first figure, the signal 
tone is operating in a bandwidth away from the jamming tones. In the second figure, the 
signal tone has been hopped close and between the two jamming tones. 
T r a n s m it t e d  
S ig n a l  
M u lt i t o n e  
J a m m in g  
 
Figure 48.   Influence of the / 146AN USQ−  Jammer in Multitone Mode over a SINCGARS 
System 
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Figure 49.   Influence of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Multitone Mode over a SINCGARS 
System in Another Hop 
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Figure 50.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Manual Spot Multitone 
Jamming ( )2q =  on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN as Compared 
to Theoretical Curves 
 
The results of the above simulation for 2,4,8M =  together with the theoretical 
results are shown in Figure 50.  It is obvious that the simulation model behaves in multi-
tone jamming as the theory predicts with small variations. As mentioned in the theoretical 
analysis, the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in multitone jamming behaves better when the or-
der of modulation is increasing. The simulation results agree with the above conclusion 
when the jammer has perfect knowledge of all the basic characteristics of the communi-
cation system, except of course, for the hop pattern. 
The above simulation model concludes the investigation of the manual spot jam-
ming mode of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer. As can be observed for all the cases of this 
mode of operation, the simulation models behaved as the theory predicted. 
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The next three sections investigate the behavior of the model in repeat jamming. 
Keeping the same communication model, which corresponds to the SINCGARS system, 
and making the proper modifications in the channel, the following sections simulate the 
noise, partial and multitone repeat jamming cases and compare the simulation results 
with the corresponding theoretical results. For all three cases it is assumed that the 
/ 146AN USQ−  jammer fulfills all the requirements of a repeat jammer. 
 
6. SINCGARS Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Repeat 
Noise Jamming 
This section introduces the simulation model of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in 
repeat jamming. This simulation model is more complicated that the previous models due 
to the fact that the jammer has knowledge of the system’s hop pattern with a probability 
0.5.  
 




The determinator of the jammer is simulated by one oscillator (token 27),  which 
is driven by the same PN code that the communication system uses (token 15).  As can be 
see in Figure 51,  in order to simulate the fact that the determinator of the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer has a probability of correctly determining the hop frequency equal to 0.5,  a pulse 
train is multiplied by the output signal of the jammer (token 36).  The pulse train has an 
equal number of ones and zeros with the result of the existence of the jammer noise inter-
ference on the correct hop frequency with a probability equal to 0.5.  Token 29  repre-
sents the time delay of the jamming interference due to the distance between the jammer 
and the receiver, and token 30  represents the processing time of the jammer’s determina-
tor. 
With the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, the effect of the repeat jammer 
in the transmitted signal can be observed. The upper part of Figure 52  presents the case 
in which the jammer has not yet determined the transmitted frequency and the signal has 
no other interference than the channel noise. 









Figure 52.   Influence of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Noise Repeat Jamming before and 
after the Determination of the Transmitted Frequency 
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The lower part of Figure 52  presents the case in which the jammer has deter-
mined the transmitted frequency and all the noise power of the jammer is centered on the 
hop frequency. The results of the above simulation for 2,4,8M =  together with the theo-
retical results are shown in Figure 53 . 















FH / 4 FSK




Figure 53.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Repeat Noise Jamming 
on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN as Compared to Theoretical 
Curves 
 
The results in Figure 53  verify that the simulation model behaves in repeat noise 
jamming as the theory predicts with small variations. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, due to software limitations, the simulation model was able to extract useful 
numerical results only for the probability of bit error greater than or equal to 910 .−  This is 
the reason the probability of error curve in the FH/8 FSK case produced eight numerical 
simulation results and not ten, as in the other two cases. 
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The next section examines the model of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in repeat par-
tial-band noise jamming and observes its performance in the SINCGARS model. 
 
7. SINCGARS Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Repeat 
Partial-Band Noise Jamming 
As discussed in Chapter VII, in repeat partial-band jamming both the communica-
tion system and the / 146AN USQ−  jammer have two choices of operational mode. These 
are the conventional and unconventional modes of operation. 
As it indicated in the theoretical analysis, the two modes of operation result in 
four cases. These cases are  
• When both the communication system and the jammer are in the conven-
tional mode, 
• When both the communication system and the jammer are in the uncon-
ventional mode, 
• When the system operates in conventional mode and the jammer in the 
unconventional mode, 
• When the system operates in unconventional mode and the jammer in the 
conventional mode. 
The random combination of all the above cases increases the complexity of the simula-
tion model dramatically, as can be seen in Figure 54.  The specific model can be de-
scribed in two parts. The first part is referred to as the upper part of the model and simu-
lates the conventional mode of the system and the jammer. The second part describes the 
lower structure of the model and represents the unconventional operational mode of the 
system and the jammer. The combination of the two above cases is achieved with the 
help of pseudorandom sources that select the operational mode of the system and the jam-
mer randomly. 
The upper part of the simulation consists of the conventional transmitter (tokens 
4  and 16),  the conventional receiver (tokens 8  and 20),  and the channel with its 
AWGN (token 12).  The / 146AN USQ −  jammer operates in conventional mode and 
consist of tokens 67, 35, 27, 29, 30  and 36.  
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The lower part of the simulation consist of the unconventional transmitter (tokens 
85, 86, 88, 89,102,113),  the unconventional receiver (tokens 112,116,117,118),  and the 
AWGN channel (token 53,  the same as token 12).  The / 146AN USQ −  jammer operates 













Figure 54.   Partial-Band Repeat Model of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer over a SINCGARS 
System for 2M =  
 
As Chapter IV demonstrated, in the unconventional mode, the FH/MFSK trans-
mitter randomly chooses one of the M  tones (tokens 85,86)  and transmits it to one of 
the r N≤  frequency slots (token 76),  where the set of r  frequency slots are selected 
pseudorandomly (token 76).  The transmitted M  tones do not carry any information, but 




In this case, 2log ( )r  information bits are transmitted. A common assumption is to 
set .r M=  The receiver consists of a bank of radiometers (token 117,118)  measuring the 
energy in the in the r  frequency slots. The slot with the largest energy is chosen as the 
transmitted symbol. In Figure 54,  the case of 2M =  is presented. For the cases of 
4M =  and 8,M =  the number of sinusoid sources increases to 4  and 8  respectively. 
Finally the random selection of the operational mode of the communication sys-
tem and the jammer is controlled by two different random sources of ones and zeros (to-
kens 103,107).  
In the following figures, with the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, the four 
cases that exist in the above system can be observed. In Figure 55,  both SINCGARS and 
the / 146AN USQ−  jammer operate in conventional mode. By comparing the upper and 
lower part of the figure, it is clear that the jammer has detected the hop frequency and 
jams the signal. 
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Figure 55.   SINCGARS and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Conventional Mode 
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Figure 56  shows the case in which the communication system operates in con-
ventional mode and the jammer in unconventional mode of operation. It is obvious that 











Figure 56.   SINCGARS in Conventional Mode and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Uncon-
ventional Mode 
 
Figure 57  shows the case in which the communication system operates in uncon-
ventional mode and the jammer in conventional mode of operation. It becomes apparent 














Figure 57.   SINCGARS in Unconventional Mode and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Con-
ventional Mode 
 
Finally Figures 58  and 59  present the case in which both the SINCGARS and the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer operate in unconventional mode. As the theory describes, the 
jammer randomly selects a part of the transmitted bandwidth and transmits its power. As 
a result, this sometimes causes the signal to be jammed by the jamming power (Figure 
58)  and causes the signal to remain unaffected from the jammer’s efficiency at other 
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Figure 58.   The SINCGARS and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Unconventional Mode 
When the Jammer Affect the Communication System 
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Figure 59.   The SINCGARS and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Unconventional Mode 
When the Jammer Does Not Affects the Communication System 
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The results of the above simulation for 2,4,8M =  together with the theoretical 
results are shown in Figure 60.  It can be seen that the simulation model behave in fol-
lower PBJ as the theory predicts with small variations. 


















Figure 60.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Repeat Partial-Band 
Jamming on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN as Compared to Theo-
retical Curves 
 
The next section investigates the influence of the / 146AN USQ−  jammer in repeat 
multitone noise jamming. This is the last and most important jamming strategy of the 
specific jammer since the theoretical analysis concluded that the repeat multitone noise 
jamming causes the largest degradation in a FH/MFSK system. 
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8. SINCGARS Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Repeat 
Multitone Noise Jamming 
As mentioned in Chapter VII, for this case, the source of interference for the 
channel is the transmission of q  tones by the / 146AN USQ −  jammer. The power of 
each tone is large enough to dominate a communicator’s tone. Based on [1] and [10], the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer can choose to inject multiple tones per channel. Due to this ca-
pability the jammer can operate in two modes: conventional and unconventional. 
In the conventional mode the jammer injects a single tone in the transmitter’s 
channel and transmits the other 1q −  tones in 1s q≤ −  distinct and randomly chosen 
channels. In the unconventional mode the jammer does not jam the transmitter’s channel, 
but randomly distributes its q  tones over the other 1N −  distinct channels such that each 
channel has at most one interfering tone. 
Since the communication system also has two modes of operation, the simulation 
model is a combination of four cases. These cases are  
• When both the communication system and the jammer are in the conven-
tional mode, 
• When both the communication system and the jammer are in the uncon-
ventional mode, 
• When the system operates in conventional mode and the jammer in the 
unconventional mode, 
• When the system operates in unconventional mode and the jammer in the 
conventional mode. 
The random combination of all the above cases increases the complexity of the simula-
tion model dramatically, as can be seen in Figure 61.  The specific model can be de-
scribed in two parts. The first one is referred to as the upper part of the model and simu-
lates the conventional mode of the system and the jammer. The second part describes the 
lower structure of the model and represents the unconventional operational mode of the 
system and the jammer. The combination of the two above cases is achieved with the 














Figure 61.   Follower Tone Jamming Model of the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer over the 
SINCGARS System for 2M =  
 
The upper part of the simulation consists of the conventional transmitter (tokens 
4  and 16),  the conventional receiver (tokens 8  and 120),  and the channel with its 
AWGN (token 12).  The / 146AN USQ −  jammer operates in conventional mode and 
consist of tokens 27, 29, 30, 31, 35,122,124  and 126.  As can be observed in this case, the 
source of interference is simulated by the NBI  token, which was presented in the simula-
tion model for the multitone manual spot jamming. In this case, the jammer transmits a 
single tone in the transmitter’s channel (token 22)  and transmits the other two tones in 
two distinct and randomly chosen channel (token 24).  
The lower part of the simulation consist of the unconventional transmitter (tokens 
85, 86, 88, 89,102  and 113),  the unconventional receiver (tokens 112,116,117  and 118),  
and the channel with its AWGN (token 53,  the same as token 12).  Figure 61  presents 
the case for 2.M =  For the cases of 4,8M =  the number of sinusoid sources increase to 
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4  and 8  respectively. In the lower part of the model the / 146AN USQ −  jammer oper-
ates in unconventional mode and consists of tokens 124,125  and 130.  In this case the 
jammer does not jam the transmitter’s channel but randomly distributes its three tones 
over three distinct channels. Finally, the random selection of the operational mode of the 
communication system and the jammer is controlled by two different random sources of 
ones and zeros (tokens 103  and 107).  
In a series of four figures, with the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, the 
four cases that exist in the above system can be observed. In Figure 62,  both the 
SINCGARS and the / 146AN USQ −  jammer operate in conventional mode. By compar-
ing the upper and lower part of the figure, it is clear that the jammer has detected the hop 
frequency and jams the signal with one tone. The other two tones are transmitted ran-
domly in the remaining channels. 
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Figure 62.   SINCGARS and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Conventional Mode 
 
Figure 63  indicates the case in which the communication system operates in con-
ventional mode and the jammer in the unconventional mode of operation. It is obvious 
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Figure 63.   SINCGARS in Conventional Mode and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Uncon-
ventional Mode 
Figure 64  shows the case in which the communication system operates in uncon-
ventional mode and the jammer in conventional mode. Due to the fact that the two tones, 
with finite probability, can coincide with one of the transmitter’s unconventional chan-
nels, the error probability is nonzero. 
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Finally, Figure 65  presents the case in which both the SINCGARS and the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer operate in unconventional mode. As the theory predicts, the 
jammer randomly selects three channels and transmits the jammer’s tones. 
 









Figure 65.   SINCGARS and the / 146AN USQ −  Jammer in Unconventional Mode 
 
The results of the above simulation for 2, 4M =  and 8  together with the theoreti-
cal results are shown in Figure 66.  It becomes obvious that the simulation model behaves 
in follower multitone jamming as the theory predicts with small variations. Figure 66  
also verifies that, as mentioned in the theoretical analysis, the performance of the com-
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Figure 66.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  in Repeat Multitone Jam-
ming ( )2q =  on the Performance of a SINCGARS System in AWGN as Compared to 
Theoretical Curves 
 
This completes the simulation modeling of all the operational modes of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer in a FH/MFSK system. Figures 40, 43, 46, 50, 53, 60  and 66  
prove that the simulation models behave as the theoretical analysis predicted in Chapters 
IV and VII. 
Regarding a probabilistic performance, verifying the theoretical results from the 
simulation models that were introduced in Chapter VIII guarantees that the / 146AN USQ−  
jammer performs optimally in a FH/MFSK system when the jammer’s operator selects 
the follower multitone jamming mode. If the jammer does not have the capability to work 
in this mode, the next most efficient strategy is the repeat partial-band jamming. On the 
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other hand, in the case when the jammer cannot operate in repeat mode the most effective 
mode for the degradation of a slow FH/MFSK system is the manual spot multitone jam-
ming technique. This technique can cause a significant error in a slow FH/MFSK system 
when the jammer has complete knowledge of the signal structure. 
The next section investigates, with the help of the SystemView software, the in-
fluence of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in the IEEE 802.11a  Standard WLAN system. 
The purpose of this simulation is to present the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jam-
mer in a non-FH commercial system. This section can be considered as a pioneer step to 
a future work with the main objective of employing military jammers against new com-
mercial technologies. 
 
B. SIMULATION OF THE AN/USQ-146 JAMMER PERFORMANCE IN A 
IEEE 802.11A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
Before analyzing the simulation model of the 802.11a  system under the influence 
of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer, the assumptions that were made must first be indicated in 
order for the following results to be understood. 
The IEEE 802.11a  Standard is designed to operate in the 5-GHz  frequency range 
with an available bandwidth of 300 MHz.  As mentioned in Chapter II, the / 146AN USQ−  
jammer can operate in the 1.5 to 2500-MHz  frequency ranges. On the other hand, based 
on Reference [ ]11 ,  the new model of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer (Rubicon II) can per-
form at frequencies up to 8.4 GHz. The assumption that was made for the following 
simulation models is that the power specifications of Rubicon II and the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer, for the manual spot jamming mode, are exactly the same. The above assumption 
is based only on [ ]11  since the manufacturer considers the detailed operational character-
istics of the Rubicon II to be classified. 
The next section presents a description of the basic characteristics of the 802.11 .a  







1. IEEE 802.11a Basic Characteristics 
The 802.11a  standard, which supports data rates of up to 54 Mbps,  is the Fast 
Ethernet analog to the 802.11 ,b  which supports data rates of up to 11 Mbps.  Like 
Ethernet and Fast Ethernet, 802.11b  and 802.11a  use an identical MAC (Media Access 
Control). However, while Fast Ethernet uses the same (except that it is faster) physical-
layer encoding scheme as Ethernet, the 802.11a  uses an entirely different encoding 
scheme, called Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM). 
Based on the IEEE standard (Reference [ ]12 ), the 802.11a  system is designed to 
operate in the 5-GHz  frequency range. Specifically, the FCC has allocated 300 MHz  of 
spectrum for unlicensed operation in the 5-GHz  block, 200 MHz  of which is at 
5150 MHz  to 5350 MHz,  with the other 100MHz  at 5725 MHz  to 5825 MHz.  The 
spectrum is split into three working domains. The first 100 MHz  in the lower section is 
restricted to a maximum power output of 50 mW.  The second 100 MHz  has a more 
generous 250 mW  power budget, while the top 100 MHz  is delegated for outdoor 
applications, with a maximum of 1 W  power output. This specific portion of bandwidth 
can be interfered by the / 146AN USQ −  jammer (Rubicon II). 
 Upper U-NII Bands: 4  Carriers  in 100 / 20MHz MHz Spacing 
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Figure 67.   Four Independent Clear Channels in the Upper 100MHz  of the 5-GHz  Spectrum 






The 802.11a  standard gains some of its performance from the higher frequencies 
at which it operates. The laws of information theory tie frequency, radiated power and 
distance together in an inverse relationship. Thus, moving up to the 5-GHz  spectrum 
from 2.5-GHz  (802.11 )b  leads to shorter distances, given the same radiated power and 
encoding scheme. In addition, the encoding mechanism used to convert data into analog 
radio waves can encode one or more bits per radio cycle (Hertz). By rotating and manipu-
lating the radio signal, vendors can encode more information in the same time slice. To 
ensure that the remote host can decode these more complex radio signals, more power 
must be used at the source to compensate for signal distortion and fade. The 802.11a  
technology overcomes some of the distance loss by increasing the EIRP  to the maximum 
1 W.  
However, power alone is not enough to maintain the 802.11b -like distances in an 
802.11a  environment. To compensate, vendors specified and designed a new physical-
layer encoding technology that departs from the traditional direct-sequence technology 
being deployed today. This technology is called COFDM (coded OFDM). COFDM 
works by breaking one high-speed data carrier into several lower-speed subcarriers, 
which are then transmitted in parallel. Each high-speed carrier is 20 MHz  wide, as Fig-
ure 67  shows, and is broken up into 52  subchannels, each approximately 300 kHz  wide. 
COFDM uses 48  of these subchannels for data, while the remaining four are used for 
error correction. COFDM delivers higher data rates and a high degree of multipath reflec-
tion recovery, owing to its encoding scheme and error correction. 
 
2. IEEE 802.11a Simulation Model 
The structure of IEEE 802.11a  model is based on Reference [ ]13 .  The suite of 
the modulation parameters valid for the 802.11a  system is given in Table 13.  In this 




Table 13.   802.11a  Modulation Parameters [From Ref. 13 ] 
 
The overall block diagram is shown in Figure 68.  The 54 Mbps  data source (to-
ken 10)  is first sampled at once per bit (token 11).  Token 12  is the [131,171] constraint 
length 7  convolutional encoder. The data rate out of the encoder is 108  Mbps. Token 55  
follows this, which performs the puncturing operation. The net effect is that for every 
three bits into the convolutional encoder there are four bits out of the puncture token. 
Thus the rate is now 72  Mbps. The data is then interleaved in token 27.  The bit-to-
symbol token 14  and the QMAP token 15  combine to produce the proper baseband 
I and Q  signals. The symbol rate is 12  Msymb/s. 
Then it follows the procedure of the packet structure. The General Demultiplexer 
(token 18)  splits the data symbols into the appropriate segments for use by the General 
Multiplexer (token 19).  Token 19  assembles the packet for the I  signal, and it has 13  
segments in order to create the 48  data subcarriers per symbol. A similar discussion ap-
plies for the Q  signal. The sync data is controlled by a 7 -stage PN source (token 16 ). 
The total is 64  carriers required by the OFDM symbol modulator. The final I and Q  sig-





Figure 68.   IEEE 802.11a  Simulation Model 
 
The steps just described for the modulation process are applied in reverse order to 
recover the original data. In the demodulation process, it is important to emphasize the 
fact that token 49,  which represents the convolutional decoder, operates in soft decision 
mode. For the hard decision case, the SystemView by Elanix does not produce the correct 
results. This malfunction in the simulation is caused by the punctured and de-punctured 
tokens ( )55, 48 .  The de-punctured code for every punctured bit adds a zero-bit resulting 
in the incorrect hard decoding decision from the convolutional decoder (token 49).  
On the other hand, the theoretical analysis of the performance of the IEEE 
802.11a , 64QAM ( )3 4R =  in soft decision decoding (SDD) is extremely complicated, 
and there are no any publications referring to the performance of the above communica-
tion scheme under the influence of barrage, partial-band or multitone jamming. Only for 
the case of the IEEE 802.11a , 64QAM ( )3 4R =  in AWGN it is feasible to compare the 
simulation results with the theoretical results that were presented in Reference [ ]14 . 
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Before investigating the influence of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer (Rubicon II) 
model in different types of manual spot jamming, it is important to observe the above 
simulation under the effect of the AWGN only in order to verify that the IEEE 802.11a  
model behaves as the theoretical analysis of Reference [ ]14  predicts. 
 
3. IEEE 802.11a Model in AWGN 
The simulation model of the IEEE 802.11a  in AWGN is illustrated in Figure 69.  
Enabling token 65  as a variable token, the system is executing for ten different, continu-
ously decreasing values of noise power ( ) ,oN  which correspond to ten different, con-
tinuously increasing, values of 0 .bE N  
 






In Figure 70,  with the help of the SystemView’s oscilloscope, one of the four 
channels of Figure 67  can be observed in detail. The upper part of the figure illustrates 
the signal spectrum of the 802.11a  system without noise. In the lower part the influence 
of the channel noise has been added. 
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Figure 70.   Influence of AWGN in the 802.11a ’s Signal Spectrum 
 
It is obvious that the AWGN influences the shape of the signal’s spectrum. Figure 
71  presents the simulated probability of bit error together with the corresponding theo-
retical results from Reference [ ]14 . 
The results in Figure 71  verify that the simulation model behaves in the AWGN 
as the theory predicts with small variations for values of 0bE N  between 0  and 9 dB.  In 
this range, the theoretical curve of the probability of bit error is equal to 1.  In the simula-
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tion model, and also in a real word system, the value of 1bP =  is impossible, so these 
variations are considered legitimate. 
 













Simulation Results of 802.11a,  64-QAM (Rc=3/4) with SDD in AWGN
Theoretical Results of 802.11a, 64-QAM (Rc=3/4) with SDD in AWGN 
 
Figure 71.   Performance of the 802.11a , ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft Decision Decoding 
in AWGN as Compared to Theoretical Curve 
 
The next step is to specify the signal-to-noise ratio ( )0bE N  of the channel, add 
the interference of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer (Rubicon II) in barrage noise jamming 
and observe its performance. 
 
4. IEEE 802.11a Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Bar-
rage Noise Jamming 
The source of interference that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer (Rubicon II) uses in 
barrage noise jamming is an AWGN with 802.11 .I I aN P W=  This interference is added in 
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the channel together with the thermal noise of the channel. Based on the assumptions 
made at the beginning of this section, the output power of the / 146AN USQ −  is the same 
as the output power of the Rubicon II. In addition, the description of the 802.11a  in Sec-
tion , ,1VIII B  shows that the bandwidth of each high-speed carrier is 802.11 20 MHz.aW =  
On the other hand, in the case of the SINCGARS system, the jammed bandwidth is 
58 MHz.ssW =  That means that the / 146AN USQ −  can produce a jamming power over 





N N= . (8.2) 
Equation (8.2) increases the / 146AN USQ−  model’s output power density by a fac-
tor of 2.9  compared to the noise PSD values that were used in the SINCGARS model. 
 
Figure 72.   Barrage Noise Jamming Model of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) Jammer over 
an 802.11 ,a  ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft Decision Decoding 
Figure 72  presents the simulation model for the barrage noise jamming of the 
802.11 .a  The / 146AN USQ−  in this case consists of tokens 75  and 76.  Token 75  repre-
sents the noise source and token 76  restricts the output noise power in the bandwidth of 
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802.11 .aW  As in the previous cases, the AWGN channel (token 69 ) has a constant value of 
0 13.35 dB,bE N =  which entails a probability of bit error, in the 802.11a  system, close 
to 510 .−  The jammer is expected to increase the probability of bit error of the system be-
tween the range of 0.5  and 510 .−  The produced BER curve of the above simulation model 
can be observed in Figure 73.  
 














Figure 73.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) in Barrage 
Noise Jamming on the Performance of an 802.11 ,a  ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft De-
cision Decoding System in the AWGN 
Figure 73  indicates that the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer has a satisfac-
tory influence over the 802.11a  standard when the jamming power becomes equal to the 
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signal’s power ( )0 dB .b IE N ≈  For larger values of signal-to-interference noise ratio, a 
severe decrease in the produced probability of bit error appears. In the range of 
0 dB 2 dB,b IE N≤ <  the barrage noise jammer causes an error in the 802.11a  system, 
which is 20 dB  greater than the error produced by the AWGN. However, the probability 
of bit error cannot be considered efficient enough. Furthermore, for 20 dBb IE N ≈ , the 
BER curve approaches the error floor of 510 .−  
The following section investigates the performance of the jammer in partial-band 
noise jamming for various values of ρ  and with the same level of AWGN. 
 
5. IEEE 802.11a Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Par-
tial-Band Noise Jamming 
The simulation model in the partial-band case is the same as in the BNJ model. 
The only difference exists in the values of the tokens 75  and 76,  which determine the 
part of the bandwidth that will be jammed and the corresponding output noise PSD. 
Table 14  presents the values of 802.11jammed aW Wρ =  that will be examined in the 
model of Figure 74,  together with the corresponding values of the jammed bandwidth 
(token 75)  and the jamming noise power IN  (token 76).  
ρ  jammedW  Increase in IN  
0.5  10 MHz  2 IN⋅  
0.4  8 MHz  2.5 IN⋅  
0.3  6 MHz  3.33 IN⋅  
0.2  4 MHz  5 IN⋅  
0.1  2 MHz  10 IN⋅  
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Figure 74.   Partial-Band Noise Jamming Model of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) Jammer 
over an 802.11a , ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft Decision Decoding 
 
For each one of the above values of ,ρ  the SystemView produced the corre-
sponding probability of bit error curve. Figure 75,  for comparison reasons, presents the 






















Figure 75.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) in Partial-
Band Jamming for Various ρ  on the Performance of an 802.11a , ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  
with Soft Decision Decoding System in AWGN 
 
The examination of Figure 75  leads to the conclusion that the / 146AN USQ −  
(Rubicon II) jammer improves its performance over an 802.11 ,a  ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  
with SDD system as the value of ρ  becomes smaller. Due to the fact that all the BER 
curves cross close to the point 110bP
−=  when 4 dB,b IE N =  the improvement of the 
jammer’s performance becomes more obvious for values of b IE N  greater than 4 dB. 
Additionally for SJR between 0  and 4 dB,  the effect of the jamming signal is severe for 
every .ρ  
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As the signal-to-jamming ratio increases, the probability of error curves for all ρ  
have the tendency to meet the same value of .bP  This value is in the range of 
510 ,−  which 
is the error produced due to the AWGN. 
In Figure 76,  the results from Figures 73  and 75  have been overlaid in order to 
compare the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer in PBJ and BNJ. 

























Figure 76.   Comparison of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) Jammer in Barrage 
and Partial-Band Noise Jamming over an 802.11a , ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft De-
cision Decoding System 
 
Consequently, comparing the simulation results of the two above jamming strate-
gies shows that the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer performs better over an 
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802.11 ,a  ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  system when it operates in the PBJ. In addition, as the 
fraction of the jammed bandwidth ( )ρ  decreases, the jamming efficiency increases. Es-
pecially for the case of 0.1,ρ =  the PBJ technique is almost 5 dB  superior that the BNJ. 
The next section presents the last simulation model of the 802.11 ,a  64 QAM−  
( )3 4cR =  with SDD system under the influence of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) 
jammer. In this case, the jammer is simulated to operate with the manual spot multitone 
jamming technique. 
 
6. IEEE 802.11a Model under the Influence of the AN/USQ-146 in Mul-
titone Noise Jamming 
As the description of the 802.11a  illustrated, the basic concept of the OFDM 
technology is to transmit high-speed serial data at a much lower rate in parallel on N  
subcarriers that are orthogonally spaced. 
Consequently, a single broadband data-stream is represented by many narrowband 
data-streams. The orthogonality of the subcarriers allows the frequency guard-band, re-
quired for the FH/MFSK, to be removed. In the presence of highly frequency-selective 
fading, the channel has a narrow coherence bandwidth due to multipath echoes and this 
modulation scheme provides frequency diversity in these circumstances. In effect, the 
frequency selective fade for a single carrier has been replaced by uncorrelated flat fades 
for the OFDM system. Based on [ ]15 ,  this, in itself, is not an advantage, but by using 
forward error-correction (FEC) coding and interleaving in the time and frequency-
domains, advantage can be taken of the uncorrelated fades to improve the bit error rate. 
In some respects, the generation of errors due to highly frequency selective fading 
and tone jamming are similar. As a result, based on the fact that the primary purpose of 
the structure of the OFDM is to resist fading or tone jamming, it is expected that the 
/ 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer in multitone jamming will not be as effective as it 
was in the previous two cases. 
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As mentioned in Chapter II, the jammer is capable of simultaneously transmitting 
two tones over the hostile signal. Figure 77 shows that the OFDM channel consist of two 
signals, the I  and the .Q  In order to implement the I  and the Q  signal of the two jam-
ming tones (tokens 79  and 80),  the produced tones pass through the IQ-Mixer (tokens 
77  and 81)  and then are added to the corresponding channels. The IQ-Mixer token pro-





Figure 77.   Multitone Jamming Model of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) Jammer in 
802.11 ,a  ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft Decision Decoding 
For reasons of comparison and in order to verify that the simulation model be-
haves as the theory predicts, two strategies are investigated concerning the center fre-
quencies of the jamming tones. In the first strategy, the produced two jamming tones are 
perfectly aligned with two of the subchannel frequencies of the transmitted signal. In the 
second strategy, the frequencies of the simulated jamming signals are chosen to fall mid-
way between the adjacent subchannels tones of the OFDM signal. 
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Keeping the signal-to-noise-ratio equal to 13.35 dB (token 69)  and setting the 
tones power as a variable, the above simulation model was executed for thirteen continu-
ously decreasing values of the tone jamming power ( )4 dB 22 dBb IE N− ≤ ≤  for the 
above strategies. The received BER curves are seen in Figure 78.  
 















Figure 78.   Simulation Results of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) in Two 
Strategies of Multitone Jamming ( )2q =  on the Performance of an 802.11 ,a  
( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft Decision Decoding System in AWGN 
 
The results in Figure 78  indicate that the best multitone jamming strategy is the 
second. In this strategy the jamming tones were chosen to fall midway between adjacent 
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subchannel tones. Based on [ ]15 ,  when the frequency of the jamming signal is perfectly 
aligned with one of the subchannel frequencies of the transmitted signal only data on the 
carrier is affected by the jamming signal when the received signal is processed using the 
FFT algorithm. Furthermore, once the jamming power significantly exceeds the power of 
the hostile signal, the probability of an error on that subcarrier saturates. 
However, when the frequencies of the jamming signals lie midway between two 
subchannel frequencies, spectral leakage in the spectrum of the jamming signal impacts 
the other frequency components of the received signal when the received signal is proc-
essed using the FFT algorithm. In this case, the jamming power has a significant effect on 
the average bit error rate as the increased magnitude of the spectral leakage components 
of the jamming signal affect more of the hostile signal components. 
In Figure 79,  the bit error curves of the barrage noise, partial-band noise for 
0.1ρ =  and the second strategy of multitone jamming have been overlaid in order to as-
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Figure 79.   Comparison of the Effect of the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) Jammer in Barrage 
Noise, Partial-Band Noise with 0.1ρ =  and 2nd  Strategy of Multitone Jamming over an 
802.11a , ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  with Soft Decision Decoding System 
 
The probabilistic comparison of the three types of jamming shows that the effect 
of all the jamming strategies on the bit error rate of the 802.11 ,a  ( )64 QAM 3 4cR− =  
with SDD system is significant at signal-to-jamming ratios lower than 0 dB.  However, 
for 0 dBb IE N >  the partial-band jamming presents the best performance of all the 
jamming strategies. On the other hand, it is observed that the effect of the multitone jam-
ming is insignificant and as the SJR increases it becomes even worse than the barrage 
noise jamming. This occurred due to the rapid slope that the multitone jamming bit error 
rate curve presents for values of 0 dB.b IE N >  As mentioned early in this section, this 
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severe decrease of the multitone jamming performance was expected and represents the 
resistance of the OFDM system in fading and tone jamming. 
Consequently, the selection of the most effective jamming strategy of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer over the 802.11 ,a  64 QAM ( 3 4)cR− =  with SDD, 
is the partial-band jamming with 0.1.ρ =  
 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the implementation of the simulation models of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer over two advanced communication systems. The first part of the 
chapter examined the simulation model of the SINGARS communication system. The 
second part investigated the simulation model of the IEEE 802.11a  standard WLAN sys-
tem in various jamming strategies of the / 146.AN USQ −  
The purpose of the implementation of the SINGARS simulation model in various 
methods of jamming was dual. Firstly, verifying the theoretical results of Chapter IV and 
VII was needed, and secondly it was necessary to create a simulation environment in 
which the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer and other similar jammers could 
be investigated. 
Both of the above purposes were achieved. The simulation results in Section A 
verified that the most effective jamming strategy that the / 146AN USQ −  jammer must 
select in order to deny the SINCGARS military communication systems is the repeat 
multitone jamming. As the theory predicted and simulation results proved, the next most 
advanced jamming strategy is the follower partial-band jamming together with the man-
ual spot multitone jamming. For all the above simulation models, it was considered that 
the jammer had full knowledge of the hostile system except for its hopping pattern. 
The second part of this chapter presented the simulation model of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer over the IEEE 802.11a  standard WLAN system. 
Specifically the 64 QAM ( 3 4)cR− =  with soft decision decoding scheme was chosen 
since this modulation option produces the highest data rate ( )54 Mbps . As mentioned in 
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the description of the 802.11a  standard, the specific system uses Orthogonal Frequency 
Division Multiplexing (OFDM) as a modulation technique and not a FH technology. This 
is the reason that the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer was simulated only for the 
manual spot mode jamming strategies. 
The simulation results showed that the most effective jamming strategy that the 
/ 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer must follow over the 802.11 ,a  64 QAM ( 3 4)cR− =  
with soft decision decoding system is the partial-band jamming. In the PBJ, the best re-
sults are obtained when 10%  of the transmission spectrum is corrupted by the 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate the performance and capabilities of one of 
the most advanced devices that detects, analyzes and denies enemy signals: the Rockwell 
Collins / 146AN USQ −  transportable communication jammer. 
The results of the theoretical analysis and the simulation modeling of the specific 
jammer, in all types of jamming over uncoded slow FH/MFSK military communication 
systems and new advanced commercial wireless standards, can be used as guidelines for 
selecting the most effective jamming strategies depending on the type of hostile wave-
form. The simulation models have a general scope of applicability much larger than the 
special case of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer. The same models with the appropriate 
changes can be used to evaluate other types of jammers over different communication 
schemes. 
The main points and conclusions of the investigation of the / 146AN USQ −  jam-
mer’s performance are summarized by chapter together with suggestions for future work. 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter II, a general description of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer was provided. 
The specific jammer operates in the 1.5-MHz  to 2500-MHz  frequency ranges. It has two 
mode of operation: the manual spot mode and the reactive mode. 
In Chapter III, the importance of investigating effective jamming techniques for 
the interference of FH communication systems was introduced. 
In Chapter IV, the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in the manual spot 
mode against the SINCGARS communication system was presented. The jamming tech-
niques that were analyzed are barrage noise jamming, partial band noise jamming and 
multitone jamming. The interference of the first two types of jamming cannot be consid-
ered efficient enough on the modern battlefield, since the effect of the jamming signal on 
the bit error rate is significant ( )0.5bP ≈  only when the jamming power becomes 1000  
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times greater than the signal power ( )30 dB .b IE N = −  On the other hand, the manual 
spot multitone jamming technique proved to be the most effective type of manual spot 
jamming with a capability of creating severe damage in a FH/MFSK system for 
0 dB.b IE N =  
In Chapters V and VI, the fundamental limitations of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer 
in reactive mode and the link budget considerations of the transmitter-jammer and jam-
mer-receiver geometriese were analyzed. It was shown that the operational characteristics 
of the specific jammer give the authority to the operator of the / 146AN USQ −  to func-
tion in the reactive mode with no practical limitations. On the other hand, the link budget 
analysis revealed that the receive sensitivity and the output transmitted power of the 
jammer are the basic factors that determine its optimum position relative to the hostile 
communication system. 
In Chapter VII, the performance of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer in repeat mode 
against the SINCGARS communication system was analyzed. In this specific mode of 
operation, the jammer can select the following three strategies: ( )1  the noise repeat jam-
ming, ( )2  repeat partial-band jamming, or ( )3  follower-tone jamming. In the theoretical 
analysis of the follower partial-band jamming and the follower multitone jamming, the 
author considered the fact that the communication system and the jammer can select to 
operate either in the conventional mode or the unconventional mode. All three reactive 
jamming strategies of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer proved to be efficient enough over the 
SINCGARS system with the follower multitone jamming technique being the most effec-
tive. 
In conclusion, the probabilistic comparison of all types of jamming in manual 
spot, and repeat modes showed that the most effective jamming strategy over an uncoded 
slow FH/MFSK system is follower multitone jamming. 
In Chapter VIII, the simulation models of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer over two 




Firstly, the advanced military FH/MFSK system called SINGARS was imple-
mented. Each model was composed of two main parts. The first part represented the 
SINCGARS communication system and the second part represented the simulation of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer for every type of jamming in manual spot and repeat mode. In 
all cases the simulation results verified the conclusions that were derived from the theo-
retical analyses in Chapters IV and VII. 
The second part of Chapter VIII investigated the performance of the new model 
of the / 146AN USQ −  jammer (Rubicon II) over the IEEE 802.11 ,a  64 QAM ( 3 4)cR− =  
with soft decision decoding WLAN commercial system. The simulation results indicated 
that the / 146AN USQ −  (Rubicon II) jammer must select the partial-band jamming with 
0.1ρ =  technique. 
Consequently, as expected, the jammer’s best strategy varies with respect to the 
modulation technique that the hostile communication system uses. As the theoretical 
analysis and the simulation results indicated, the / 146AN USQ −  jammer achieves its 
best performance over a FH/MFSK system when it selects the repeat multitone jamming 
strategy. However, when the hostile communication system is the 802.11 ,a  WLAN sys-
tem, the partial-band jamming strategy with the smallest possible fraction of jammed 
bandwidth ( )ρ  is the best solution. 
 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The basic purpose of this thesis was investigating the performance of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer against a FH/MFSK military system and the IEEE 802.11a  
WLAN commercial system. 
The basic assumptions that were made for the FH/MFSK communication system 
are listed below: 
• The hostile communication system uses an uncoded slow FH/MFSK 
modulation scheme. 
• The communication channel is an AWGN channel and is being jammed at 
every instance by a single / 146AN USQ −  jammer. 
 
166 
• The jammer fulfills all the requirements derived from Chapters V and VI 
when it operates in reactive mode. 
The basic assumptions that were made for the IEEE 802.11a  WLAN commercial 
system are: 
• The IEEE 802.11a  WLAN commercial system uses the 64 QAM ( 3 4)cR− =  
with soft decision decoding option. 
• The operational characteristics of Rubicon II and the / 146AN USQ −  
jammer for the manual spot jamming mode are exactly the same. 
Based on the above assumptions, there are four major areas that can be identified 
for future work. First, it would be interesting to observe how the performance of the 
/ 146AN USQ −  jammer changes in a coded slow FH/MFSK system. Secondly, investi-
gating a more complicated channel model as the fading channel would model the opera-
tional environment of the jammer more accurately. Thirdly, following the modern spirit 
of joint forces, it would be very interesting to examine the performance of a combination 
of jamming strategies by using two or more / 146AN USQ −  jammers at different dis-
tances and locations from the communication scheme. Finally, the theoretical analysis of 
the IEEE 802.11a  standard WLAN system with SDD in barrage noise, partial-band and 
tone jamming, and their comparison with the corresponding simulation results in Chapter 
VIII, would also be an interesting topic for further research. 
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